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A HERCULEAN TASK FOR JUDGE HERCULES: 
ANALYTICAL AVOIDANCE IN IRAN V. ELAHI 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In Iran v. Elahi,1 the United States Supreme Court missed a chance 
to weigh in on a seldom-used, yet completely radical tool in the war 
against terrorism: Section 1610(a)(7) of the Foreign Sovereign 
Immunities Act (FSIA).2  Section 1605(a)(7) peels away sovereign 
immunity so that terrorist states may be sued in United States courts 
when they injure United States citizens.3  Then remarkably, Section 
1610(a)(7) allows victims to attach that foreign state’s property in order 
to satisfy judgments obtained under the former provision.4  Congress 
amended the FSIA in 1996 to include this provision, and in so doing, 
extended the jurisdictional reach of U.S. courts further than it ever had 
before.5  Few countries in the world have so stripped away sovereign 
immunity protections, and those that have, have done so in response to 
this U.S. legislation.6  This Comment examines the health and welfare of 
this statutory provision, exploring its history and tracking its status 
through a particular case: Iran v. Elahi.  Viewed pragmatically, the 
1610(a)(7) attachment provision should be removed from the books even 
though it supports the policies of deterrence and redress.  The Supreme 
Court failed to render a clear decision on the issue, missing a chance to 
tell Congress that their provision was dead on arrival.  For reasons 
explored in this Comment, it is unlikely that the provision will ever be 
used.7  The Supreme Court should have delved more deeply into the 
heart of the provision and sent a clear signal to Congress.  If the courts 
do not apply it, the terrorist state exception is left toothless. 
In Iran v. Elahi, the 1610(a)(7) argument for attachment met with 
little success, even though it best supports the policies which underlie 
 1. Iran v. Elahi, 546 U.S. 450 (2006). 
 2. See infra Part IV. 
 3. See infra Part II. 
 4. See infra Part II. 
 5. See infra Part II. 
 6. See infra Part IV.B.3. 
 7. See infra Parts III, V. 
1
Gryta: Iran v. Elahi
Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 2008
GRYTA_FINAL 3/23/2009  2:43 PM 
250 AKRON LAW REVIEW [41:249 
 
the terrorist state exception to immunity: deterrence and redress.8  
Almost all cases filed under the terrorist state exception have been 
marked by a default judgment, as there is little incentive for a terrorist 
state defendant to appear in court,9 much less pay its judgment creditors.  
Recovery for the plaintiffs in Alejandre, Flatow, Cicippio and Rein has 
been characterized as a “Herculean task” by one scholar,10 and has been 
documented somewhat less dramatically by many others.11  As shown in 
Part III, Congress has struggled to provide a means of redress for victims 
of terrorist state attacks, but has not yet created an optimal solution.12 
The availability of a monetary judgment in the United States which 
belongs to Iran distinguishes Iran v. Elahi from a series of similar cases -  
the judgment constitutes actual attachable assets located within the 
United States and does not present the same legal hurdles which have 
limited access to diplomatic or frozen assets.13  By framing the issue as 
it did, however, the Supreme Court was able to avoid the 1610(a)(7) 
argument and an unpleasant quagmire involving the compensability of 
U.S. victims of terrorism, international politics, foreign policy, and the 
legislative history of the FSIA terrorist state exception.14 
No other terrorist state exception case has presented such a 
favorable opportunity for redress (besides Flatow),15 so it is particularly 
noteworthy that the Supreme Court missed an opportunity to clearly 
analyze the statutory pathways to redress for Elahi and shed light on 
murky FSIA doctrine for future plaintiffs.  If Iran v. Elahi is not the type 
of case that Congress had in mind when it enacted the foreign state 
 8. See infra Parts III-IV (explaining how the 1610(a)(7) attachment provision is essential in 
order to carry out the underlying policies of the terrorist state exception). 
 9. William P. Hoye, Fighting Fire With . . . Mire? Civil Remedies and the New War on 
State-Sponsored Terrorism, 12 DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L L. 105, 136 (2002) [hereinafter Hoye, 
Fighting Fire] (“Until a more broadly based group of successful plaintiffs are able to collect 
routinely on judgments awarded under the Act, without the extraordinary and unusual remedy of 
special legislation, there seems to be little incentive for foreign state defendants or their agents to 
appear, much less to defend themselves aggressively, in Antiterrorism Act cases.”). 
 10. ERNEST K. BANKAS, THE STATE IMMUNITY CONTROVERSY IN INTERNATIONAL LAW: 
PRIVATE SUITS AGAINST SOVEREIGN STATES IN DOMESTIC COURTS 293-94 (2005) [hereinafter 
BANKAS, STATE IMMUNITY].  These cases are discussed throughout the article.  See infra note 60 
for a brief summary of each.   
 11. See infra Part II.D. 
 12. See infra Part II. 
 13. It has been difficult for other terrorist state exception judgment holders to recover, in part, 
because there are few assets of terrorist states or their agencies or instrumentalities located within 
the United States besides diplomatic or frozen assets; however, accessing these assets presents 
significant policy problems.  See infra notes 60-63 and accompanying text. 
 14. See infra Parts III-IV. 
 15. See infra note 137 and accompanying text (explaining Flatow v. Iran, 999 F. Supp. 1 
(D.D.C. 1998), in which the plaintiff similarly tried to attach the Cubic judgment). 
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attachment provision, then it is doubtful that it will ever be applied.16  
This Comment will analyze the duty of the judiciary to decide matters 
that parties set before it, arguing for a greater degree of analysis on both 
the Ninth Circuit and Supreme Court levels.17 
This Comment examines the history, development, and application 
of the FSIA’s terrorist state attachment exception through the lens of 
Iran v. Elahi, as well as the larger problems and ramifications which 
ripple forth from the case.18  Part II, Sections A, B, and C present the 
background of the FSIA, the terrorist state exception, explaining the 
difference between 1610(a)(7) attachment of a foreign state’s property 
and 1610(b)(2) attachment of the property of an agency or 
instrumentality of the foreign state.19  Part III explores the intractable 
problem of recovery in terrorist state exception cases and the unfortunate 
foreign policy and constitutional ramifications of the statute as it 
stands.20  Part IV presents the background facts and procedural history 
of Iran v. Elahi.21  Part V explains the potential duty of the judiciary in 
applying scrupulous analysis to arrive at the “best” argument – the one 
contributing most fittingly to the development of the law.22 This 
Comment advocates that the common law will be better served if judges 
aspire to Dworkin’s Judge Hercules23 – a fitting ideal in the face of a 
“Herculean task.”24 
II. THE EVOLUTION OF THE PROVISION 
A.  History of the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act 
The statutory provisions addressed in Iran v. Elahi originate within 
the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976 (FSIA).25  The FSIA 
codified a longstanding history of precedent and practice which gave 
foreign states immunity from suit in United States courts, with certain 
 16. See infra Part IV. 
 17. See infra Part V. 
 18. See infra Parts II-V. 
 19. See infra Parts II.A, C. 
 20. See infra Part III. 
 21. See infra Part IV. 
 22. See infra Part V. 
 23. See infra notes 220-224 and accompanying text. 
 24. See supra note 10. 
 25. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1602-1611 (2007). 
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exceptions.26  The earliest precedent regarding foreign sovereign 
immunity held that foreign states were granted absolute immunity in 
United States courts, as presented in the landmark 1812 case, The 
Schooner Exchange v. M’Faddon.27 
In the 20th century, a restrictive theory of sovereign immunity28 
emerged in response to communism and growing governmental activity 
in the marketplace.29  During the postwar period, when the issue of 
sovereign immunity arose, courts developed the practice of deferring to 
the State Department, which initially responded with the Tate Letter,30 
presenting the restrictive theory of sovereign immunity.  The FSIA was 
enacted in 1976 to clear up confusion regarding the restrictive theory of 
 26. See Jeffrey Rabkin, Universal Justice: The Role of Federal Courts in International Civil 
Litigation, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 2120, 2132-33 (1995). 
 27. GARY B. BORN & DAVID WESTIN, INTERNATIONAL CIVIL LITIGATION IN 
UNITED STATES COURTS: COMMENTARY AND MATERIALS 450 (2d ed. 1992) (discussing 
The Schooner Exchange v. M'Faddon, 11 U.S. 116, 137-38 (1812)).  This case describes the near 
absolute immunity granted to state sovereigns sued in United States courts during the 18th and 19th 
Centuries.  The Schooner Exchange v. M’Faddon, 11 U.S. 116, 137-38 (1812).  Absolute immunity 
was predicated on the notion that sovereigns were equal and independent, thus, no sovereign state 
could bring any other within its jurisdiction for purposes of suit.  Id. at 136.  In the case, a private 
American vessel was captured by the French and converted into a French warship.  Id. at 117.  
Later, when the vessel was forced into a U.S. port due to weather, the owners were barred from 
suing France for libel due to foreign sovereign immunity.  Id. at 146-47. 
 28. See infra note 30 and accompanying text (discussing the restrictive theory of sovereign 
immunity). 
 29. Joseph Keller, The Flatow Amendment and State Sponsored Terrorism, 28 SEATTLE U. L. 
REV. 1029, 1029 (2005).  “[T]he onset of communism in the post World War II era” saw many 
foreign governments assuming commercial functions that had been traditionally carried out by 
private actors.  Id.  States took on such activities as operating airlines or commercial banks.  Id.  The 
policy behind the theory is that private citizens or companies enter into contracts with the foreign 
sovereign as they would with foreign citizens and companies and would be unable to recover for 
any breaches made by the foreign sovereign.  DAVID M. ACKERMAN, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH 
SERVICE, SUITS AGAINST TERRORIST STATES 3 (2002), 
http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/8045.pdf [hereinafter ACKERMAN, SUITS]. 
 30. Letter from Jack B. Tate, Acting Legal Adviser, U.S. Dep't of State, to Acting U.S. Att'y 
General Philip B. Perlman (May 19, 1952), reprinted in 26 DEP'T STATE BULL. 984-85 (1952). 
The Tate Letter sets forth the restrictive theory of sovereign immunity, whereby foreign states retain 
immunity for sovereign or public acts of the state, but not for private acts.  Id.  The letter failed to 
supply any guidelines for distinguishing public acts from private acts.  Id.  Previously, when a case 
against a foreign state arose, the State Department asked the Department of Justice to inform the 
court that the government supported the principle of absolute immunity, and the courts usually 
deferred to this advice.  ACKERMAN, SUITS, supra note 29, at 3.  “The Tate letter meant that the 
government would [cease to] make this suggestion in cases against foreign states involving 
commercial activity.”  Id. 
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sovereign immunity such that the judiciary could apply the law without 
application to the executive branch.31 
Dating back to The Schooner Exchange, the Supreme Court implied 
that determinations of foreign sovereign immunity were better left to the 
branches of the government that deal in politics – an analysis derived 
from the constitutional separation of powers doctrine.32  From the time 
of The Schooner Exchange until the Tate Letters, there were few suits 
against foreign sovereigns.33  Even when suits were permitted, courts 
only tiptoed into the fray, deferring to the executive branch for guidance 
for over twenty years.34  In 1973, the Department of State and the 
Department of Justice initiated the process to codify the doctrine.35  
Though well-intentioned,36 the transfer of immunity determinations 
from the executive to the judicial branch has put the judiciary in what 
has historically been an uncomfortable proximity to foreign policy-
37
 31. Keith Sealing, “State Sponsors of Terrorism” Is a Question, Not an Answer: The 
Terrorism Amendment to the FSIA Makes Less Sense Now Than It Did Before 9/11, 38 TEX. INT’L 
L.J. 119, 122 (2003). 
 32. See Todd Connors, The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act: Using Separation of Powers 
Analysis to Guide Judicial Decision-Making, 26 LAW & POL’Y INT’L BUS. 203, 206-07 (1994) 
[hereinafter Connors, Separation of Powers].  Connors laments that the FSIA, “has during its brief 
lifetime been a financial boon for the private bar but a constant bane of the federal judiciary.”  Id. at 
203. 
 33. See supra note 27 and accompanying text (discussing The Schooner Exchange). 
 34. See supra notes 28-30 and accompanying text (discussing the Tate Letters). 
 35. Connors, Separation of Powers, supra note 32, at 213-14.  The decision to codify the 
FSIA was not made without serious deliberation, as these departments consulted with the Judiciary 
Committee of the House of Representatives to draft H.R. 11315, which became the Foreign 
Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976.  Id. 
 36. The act was actually created to help de-politicize determinations on foreign sovereign 
immunity.  Id. at 215-16. The legislative history of the 1976 FSIA contains the following: 
A principal purpose of this bill is to transfer the determination of sovereign immunity 
from the executive branch to the judicial branch, thereby reducing the foreign policy 
implications of immunity determinations and assuring litigants that these often crucial 
decisions are made on purely legal grounds and under procedures that insure due 
process.  The Department of State would be freed from pressures from foreign 
governments to recognize their immunity from suit and from any adverse consequences 
resulting from an unwillingness of the Department to support that immunity.  As was 
brought out in the hearings on the bill, U.S. immunity practice would conform to the 
practice in virtually every other country-- where sovereign immunity decisions are made 
exclusively by the courts and not by a foreign affairs agency. 
H.R. REP. 94-1487 at 7. 
 37. Connors, Separation of Powers, supra note 32, at 218 (“The Act, lacking a viable 
standard of guidance, provides the federal judiciary with tremendous incentive to evaluate or even 
formulate U.S. foreign policy.”). 
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B. Structure of the FSIA 
The FSIA preserves a traditional distinction between general 
sovereign immunity from suit and immunity from attachment in aid of 
execution.38  Section 160439 sets forth the general rule that a foreign 
sovereign will be immune from suit in the United States, unless one of 
the exceptions listed in Section 1605 applies.40  Section 160941 provides 
generally that the property of a foreign sovereign and that of its agencies 
and instrumentalities is immune from attachment and execution unless 
one of the exceptions listed in Section 161042 applies.  The exceptions 
 38. 28 U.S.C. 1602 (1976) (offering a statement of the purpose of the Foreign Sovereign 
Immunities Act).  The provision reads: 
The Congress finds that the determination by the United States courts of claims of 
foreign states to immunity from the jurisdiction of such courts would serve the interests 
of justice and would protect the rights of both foreign states and litigants in the United 
States courts.  Under international law, states are not immune from the jurisdiction of 
foreign courts insofar as their commercial activities are concerned, and their commercial 
property may be levied upon for the satisfaction of judgments rendered against them in 
connection with their commercial activities. 
Id.  Iran v. Cubic Defense Systems, Inc. 385 F.3d 1206, 1218 (9th Cir. 2004).  The Ninth Circuit 
commented that the drafters of the FSIA intended to lower the barriers to immunity from attachment 
in order to closely mirror the provisions on sovereign immunity (citing H.R. Rep. 94-1487, at 27 
(1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6604, 6626). 
 39. 28 U.S.C. § 1604 (1976) (“Subject to existing international agreements to which the 
United States is a party at the time of enactment of this Act [enacted Oct. 21, 1976] a foreign state 
shall be immune from the jurisdiction of the courts of the United States and of the States except as 
provided in sections 1605 to 1607 of this chapter.”). 
 40. 28 U.S.C. § 1605 (1976) (“(a) A foreign state shall not be immune from the jurisdiction of 
courts of the United States or of the States in any case . . . .”).  The statute then lists seven 
exceptions to general sovereign immunity, loosely paraphrased here as including: (1) when a 
sovereign implicitly or explicitly waives its immunity; (2) when the action is based on a commercial 
activity; (3) when  rights in property taken in violation of international law are at issue and property 
exchanged for that property is in the United States in connection with a commercial activity; (4) 
when property in the United States acquired by gift or succession or rights in immovable property 
are in issue; (5) when a tort claim for money damages is sought against a foreign state for actions in 
the United States caused by the act or omission of that foreign state, official, or employee; (6) when 
an action is brought to enforce an agreement the foreign state made with a private party to submit to 
arbitration; (7) when a United States national seeks money damages against a foreign state, who has 
been named a state-sponsor of terrorism, for personal injury or death caused by a terrorist act such 
as torture or extra-judicial killing (terrorist state exception).  Id. 
 41. 28 U.S.C. § 1609 (1976) (“Subject to existing international agreements to which the 
United States is a party at the time of enactment of this Act [enacted Oct. 21, 1976] the property in 
the United States of a foreign state shall be immune from attachment arrest and execution except as 
provided in sections 1610 and 1611 of this chapter.” ). 
 42. 28 U.S.C. § 1610 (1976).  Under § 1610 of the FSIA, property of a foreign state or 
property of a foreign state’s agencies or instrumentalities  may be attached if it falls into one of the 
following exceptions: 
(a) The property in the United States of a foreign state, as defined in section 
1603(a) of this chapter, used for a commercial activity in the United States, shall 
6
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are divided into two categories, with separate provisions for property of 
a foreign state and property of the foreign state’s agencies or 
instrumentalities.43 
not be immune from attachment in aid of execution, or from execution, upon a 
judgment entered by a court of the United States or of a State after the effective 
date of this Act, if – 
(1) the foreign state has waived its immunity from attachment in aid of execution 
or from execution either explicitly or by implication, notwithstanding any 
withdrawal of the waiver the foreign state may purport to effect except in 
accordance with the terms of the waiver, or 
(2) the property is or was used for the commercial activity upon which the claim is 
based, or 
(3) the execution relates to a judgment establishing rights in property which has 
been taken in violation of international law or which has been exchanged for 
property taken in violation of international law, or 
(4) the execution relates to a judgment establishing rights in property – 
(A) which is acquired by succession or gift, or 
(B) which is immovable and situated in the United States: provided that such 
property is not used for purposes of maintaining a diplomatic or consular mission 
or the residence of the Chief of such mission, or 
(5) the property consists of any contractual obligation or any proceeds from such a 
contractual obligation to indemnify or hold harmless the foreign state or its 
employees under a policy of automobile or other liability or casualty insurance 
covering the claim which merged into the judgment, or 
(6) the judgment is based on an order confirming an arbitral award rendered against 
the foreign state, provided that attachment in aid of execution, or execution, would 
not be inconsistent with any provision in the arbitral agreement, or 
(7) the judgment relates to a claim for which the foreign state is not immune under 
section 1605(a)(7), regardless of whether the property is or was involved with the 
act upon which the claim is based. 
(b) In addition to subsection (a), any property in the United States of an agency or 
instrumentality of a foreign state engaged in commercial activity in the United 
States shall not be immune from attachment in aid of execution, or from execution, 
upon a judgment entered by a court of the United States or of a State after the 
effective date of this Act, if – 
(1) the agency or instrumentality has waived its immunity from attachment in aid 
of execution or from execution either explicitly or implicitly, notwithstanding any 
withdrawal of the waiver the agency or instrumentality may purport to effect 
except in accordance with the terms of the waiver, or 
(2) the judgment relates to a claim for which the agency or instrumentality is not 
immune by virtue of section 1605(a) (2), (3), (5), or (7), or 1605(b) of this chapter, 
regardless of whether the property is or was involved in the act upon which the 
claim is based. 
28 U.S.C. § §1610(a)-(b).  Section 1610(a)(7) and (b)(2) both remove attachment immunity after 
general sovereign immunity has been lifted due to the terrorist state exception of § 1605(a).  Id.  
Section 1611 sets out certain types of property which are categorically immune to execution, 
including, for example, the property of a foreign central bank or property used in connection with a 
military activity.  28 U.S.C. § 1611 (1976). 
 43. Id. 
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C. The Terrorist State Exception to the FSIA 
The youngest of the FSIA exceptions, the terrorist state exception 
to general sovereign immunity, and the attendant exception to 
attachment immunity were not included in the original 1976 draft of the 
FSIA.44 Congress amended the FSIA in 1996 to include Sections 
1605(a)(7), 1610(a)(7), and 1610(b)(2) through the Antiterrorism and 
Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA).45  The amendments to the FSIA 
formed a tiny part of a long series of measures intended to protect 
United States citizens from terrorism at home or abroad, and to provide 
victims and their families with redress.46  The act authorizes civil suits 
by victims of terrorism against foreign states that the Department of 
State has designated as official state sponsors of terrorism.47 
Two events spurred the passage of the terrorist exception to 
immunity: national frustration over the holding of Smith v. Socialist 
People’s Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, which denied lifting Libya’s 
sovereign immunity to permit the suit of the victims of the bombing of 
Pan Am flight 103;48 and national outrage over the Oklahoma City 
bombing.49  Families of the Pan Am bombing victims lobbied Congress 
 44. Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 
1214 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. §§ 1605(a)(7), 1610(a)(7), and 1610(b)(2)). 
 45. Id.  See also ACKERMAN, SUITS, supra note 29, at 3-4. 
 46. President’s Statement on Signing the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 
1996, 32 Weekly Comp. Pres. Doc. 719, 721 (Apr. 29, 1996).  The act included many tools that aid 
the fight against terrorism, such as an enlargement of jurisdiction to prosecute those who commit 
terrorist acts in the United States, a ban on fundraising for terrorist organizations in the United 
States, an increase in penalties for many terrorist crimes.  Id.  President Clinton did remark in the 
signing statement that the legislation was created as a response to the Oklahoma City bombings.  Id. 
 47. 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(7) (1996).  The list currently includes Cuba, Iran, Libya, North 
Korea, Sudan, and Syria.  See 22 C.F.R. § 126.1(d) (2004). 
 48. Smith v. Socialist People’s Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, 101 F.3d 239 (1996), cert. denied, 
520 U.S. 1204 (1997).  Families of the victims of the Pan Am flight 103 crash sued Libya in federal 
court, arguing that Libya violated a jus cogens norm by its involvement causing the crash, thus 
waiving its sovereign immunity under the FSIA.  Id. at 242-45. 
 49. S. Rep. No. 104-179, at 28 (1996), as reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1, 940-941.  Senate 
Report on the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, which amended the FSIA to 
include the terrorist state exception to sovereign immunity, provided the context for the amendment 
in the comments of Senator Leahy: 
When the bomb exploded outside the Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma City earlier 
this year, my thoughts and prayers, and I suspect that those of all Americans, turned 
immediately to the victims of this horrendous act. It is my hope that through this 
substitute we will proceed to enact a series of improvements in our growing body of law 
recognizing the rights and needs of victims of crime.  We can do more to see that victims 
of crime, including terrorism, are treated with dignity and assisted and compensated with 
government help. . . . The substitute will fill a gap in our law for residents of the United 
States who are victims of terrorism and mass violence that occur outside of the borders 
of the United States. . . . One of the continuing tragedies of the downing of Pan Am 
8
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for the ability to sue those responsible.50  A 1994 Report of the House 
Judiciary Committee explained that the legislation was crucial because 
victims had no other means of redress.51  The legislation was also 
supported by other policy reasons, such as deterrence of terrorist acts 
and the need to hold state supporters of terrorism accountable for their 
actions.52 
There were voices in both the House of Representatives53 and the 
Senate54 that argued against the passage of the terrorist exception.  
Those who dissented felt that either the legislation was an unnecessary 
flight 103 over Lockerbie, Scotland is that the U.S. Government has no authority to 
provide assistance or compensation to the victims of that heinous crime.  Likewise the 
U.S. victims of the Achille Lauro incident could not be given aid.  This was wrong and 
should be remedied. 
Id. 
 50. Allison Taylor, Another Front in the War on Terrorism? Problems with Recent Changes 
to the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, 45 ARIZ. L. REV. 533, 536 (2003) [hereinafter Taylor, 
Another Front] (citing Victims' Access to Terrorist Assets: Hearing on Amendments to the Foreign 
Sovereign Immunities Act Before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 106th Cong. 44-45 (1999) 
(statement of Allan Gerson)). 
 51. H.R. Rep. No. 103-702, at 4 (1994).  The report states: 
The difficulty U.S. citizens have had in obtaining remedies for torture and other injuries 
suffered abroad illustrates the need for remedial legislation.  A foreign sovereign violates 
international law if it practices torture, summary execution, or genocide.  Yet under 
current law a U.S. citizen who is tortured or killed abroad cannot sue the foreign 
sovereign in U.S. courts, even when the foreign country wrongly refuses to hear the 
citizen’s case.  Therefore, in some instances a U.S. citizen who was tortured (or the 
family of one who was murdered) will be without a remedy. 
Id. 
 52. 142 Cong. Rec. H3605-04, *H3615 (1996) (Conf. Rep) (“We must not surrender to 
terrorism, we must conquer it. We cannot allow the seeds of destruction to be sewn in our country. 
We must send the message loud and clear that the United States will act decisively against those 
who attempt to undermine civility.”). 
 53. Hon. Don Young of Alaska, Remarks before the United States House of Representatives 
(Apr. 18, 1996), in 142 Cong. Rec. E638-01, 1996 WL 200079 (“I strongly feel that this legislation 
is a knee jerk reaction to a most heinous crime.  This body has passed enough legislation in previous 
years to catch and punish criminals who commit these atrocious acts against humanity.”). 
 54. Jamison Borek offered reasons for Congress not to amend the FSIA to include the 
terrorism immunity exception. (1) it diverges from the general practice of states and, if other states 
perceive the U.S. as deviating too far from generally established immunity, decreases U.S. 
credibility and influence; (2) states do not want to enter into the domestic courts of another to 
defend alleged wrongdoing; (3) the bill may hurt U.S. foreign relations.  In order to punish states 
that sponsor terrorism, the U.S. coordinates with other nations to impose sanctions.  The possibility 
of civil suits against such sponsors of terrorism adds unpredictability to these delicate calibrations; 
(4) potential judgments may interfere with U.S. counter-terrorism goals; (5) if the U.S. expands 
jurisdiction over cases involving alleged harm by a foreign state done outside the U.S., there is the 
potential for other states to reciprocate.  The Foreign Sovergn Immunities Act: Hearing on S. 825 
Before the Subcomm. on Courts and Administrative Practice of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 
103d Cong. 12 (1994) (statement of Jamison S. Borek, Deputy Legal Advisor, Department of State). 
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emotional response55 or that it would upset foreign relations.56 
Nevertheless, Congress passed the terrorist state exception and its 
attendant exceptions to attachment liability, which has led to the 
following conundrum.57 
III. THE PROBLEM OF ENFORCEMENT AND THE PROBLEM WITH 
ENFORCEMENT 
A. The Problem of Enforcement 
For plaintiffs who have obtained judgments against state sponsors 
of terrorism, recovery has been nearly impossible.58  As earlier noted, 
Bankas has colorfully labeled the enforcement of such judgments a 
“Herculean task.”59  In most cases, the terrorist state has failed to 
respond to the suit and the court has entered a default judgment.60  
Finding no commercial property to attach (and for reasons explored in 
 55. See supra note 53 and accompanying text. 
 56. See supra note 54 and accompanying text. 
 57. See supra note 40 and accompanying text. 
 58. See infra note 66 and supra note 51 (regarding the extreme difficulty in having judgments 
paid).  Micco writes: 
The primary goal of these plaintiffs is to have a court render such a judgment publicly 
with the prospect of inflicting financial retribution upon the offending state and its agent.  
The matter of monetary damages may be dispensed for purposes of this analysis, since 
the prospect of actual recovery under any scenario advanced, thus far, is negligible. 
Richard T. Micco, Putting the Terrorist-Sponsoring State in the Dock: Recent Changes in the 
Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act and the Individual’s Recourse Against Foreign Powers, 14 
TEMP. INT’L & COMP. L.J. 109, 142 (2000).  He also remarks that terrorist states are unlikely to 
submit themselves to the jurisdiction of U.S. courts.  Id. at 111.  The problem of recovery has been 
amplified when the defendant is Iran.  ALICIA M. HILTON, AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, THE 
PERSEPOLIS TABLETS: TERROR VICTIMS TARGET ANCIENT PERSIAN ARTIFACTS (2007) 
http://www.abanet.org/litigation/litigationupdate/2007/april_hottopics.html (quoting attorney David 
J. Strachman: “Iran is a very rich country but with few to no assets in the United States. Most were 
liquidated decades ago; the rest is generally diplomatic property immune under the Vienna 
Accords.”). 
 59. See BANKAS, STATE IMMUNITY, supra note 10 and accompanying text. 
 60. See, e.g., Alejandre v. Republic of Cuba, 996 F. Supp. 1239 (S.D. Fla. 1997).  In 
Alejandre, a federal district court awarded the families of three of the four occupants of the 
“Brothers to the Rescue” planes a total of $187.7 million in a default judgment against Cuba.  See 
also Flatow v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 999 F. Supp. 1 (D.D.C. 1998) (default judgment); Cicippio 
v. Iran, 18 F. Supp. 2d 62 (D.D.C. 1998) (default judgment);  Anderson v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 
90 F. Supp. 2d 107 (D.D.C. 2000) (default judgment); Daliberti v. Republic of Iraq, 97 F. Supp. 2d 
38 (D.D.C. 2000) (default judgment); Higgins v. Islamic Republic of Iran, No. 99-377, 2000 WL 
33674311 (D.D.C. Sept. 21, 2000) (default judgment). In a particularly interesting case, Rubin v. 
Iran, the plaintiffs tried to enforce their default judgment by attempting to attach ancient Persian 
artifacts in the possession of the University of Chicago using the 1610(a)(7) commercial activity 
exception, under a theory of agency.  Rubin v. Iran, 349 F. Supp. 2d 1108 (N.D.Ill.2004). 
10
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Part V, it is unlikely they would),61 plaintiffs in the first lawsuits 
creatively attempted to satisfy their awards by attaching consular 
property and frozen assets until the Clinton administration intervened to 
stop the attachments.62 
In 1998, Congress attempted to remedy the situation by specifically 
authorizing the attachment of frozen and diplomatic assets to satisfy 
judgments obtained under the terrorist exception.63  However, Congress 
was only able to bypass a presidential veto by including a provision 
which allowed the president to waive attachment in the interest of 
national security.64  Congress continued the tug-of-war in 2000 by 
 61. One of the main reasons for this is the abundance of trade embargos and restrictions the 
United States maintains with the terrorist sovereigns on the State Department’s list.  See infra Part 
V.  A related obstacle to satisfying judgments, the extreme nature of the terrorist exception, makes it 
unlikely to be enforced by the courts of other nations.  According to Strauss: 
One impediment to the enforcement of the judgments against terrorist organizations and 
the parties that support them can be found in the common trends of international law. As 
a general matter, judgments of U.S. courts will often be enforced by foreign courts on 
the basis of reciprocity and comity in countries where the losing party or its property can 
be found. Foreign courts, however, sometimes refuse to enforce judgments of U.S. courts 
if they view the amount of money awarded to be excessive, if there are punitive or treble 
damages, or if they think the court extended its net of jurisdiction too widely. 
Debra M. Strauss, Enlisting the U.S. Courts in a New Front: Dismantling the International Business 
Holdings of Terrorist Groups Through Federal Statutory and Common-Law Suits, 38 VAND. J. 
TRANSNAT’L L. 679, 724-25 (2005) [hereinafter Strauss, Enlisting]. 
 62. JENNIFER K. ELSEA, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, LAWSUITS AGAINST STATE 
SPONSORS OF TERRORISM: AN OVERVIEW 3 (2005), http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/terror/RS22094.pdf  
(“[T]he Clinton administration intervened to oppose the attachments, arguing that the United States 
has international treaty obligations to protect all countries’ diplomatic and consular properties, that 
the blocked assets of foreign States provide useful diplomatic leverage and should remain available 
for future use, that the attachment of the blocked assets by early claimants under the FSIA exception 
would mean that nothing would be left to compensate future claimants, and that the attachment of 
both kinds of assets would expose U.S. assets to reciprocal action in certain foreign States.”).  The 
administration also said that the attachment of frozen assets would violate the Vienna Convention 
on Diplomatic Relations, the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations and the Iran-United States 
Claims Tribunal agreements.  ACKERMAN, SUITS, supra note 29, at 6-7.  Frozen assets were notably 
and successfully used as political leverage to obtain the release of hostages during the Iranian 
hostage crisis.  Id. 
 63. Omnibus Consolidated and Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act of 1999, Pub. L. 
No. 105-277, § 117, 112 Stat. 2681-491 (1998). 
 64. When he signed Public Law No. 105-277 into law, President Clinton executed the waiver.  
Presidential Determination No. 99-1 waived all of the requirement that certain property described 
by the statute “be subject to execution or attachment in aid of execution of any judgment” entered 
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1605 (a)(7). 53 Fed. Reg. 59201 (1999). Presidential Determination No. 99-
1 was then superseded by Presidential Determination No. 2001-03 which says: 
By the authority vested in me as President by the Constitution and laws of the United 
States of America, including section 2002 (f) of H.R. 3244, “Victims of Trafficking and 
Violence Protection Act of 2000,” (approved October 28, 2000), I hereby determine that 
subsection (f)(1) of section 1610 of title 28, United States Code, . . . would impede the 
ability of the President to conduct foreign policy in the interest of national security and 
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enacting Section 2002 of the Victims of Trafficking and Violence 
Protection Act of 2000 (VTVPA),65 which allocated United States 
Treasury funds to pay money damages to judgment holders in eleven 
separate cases.66  The band-aid statute provided no means of recovery 
for subsequent claimants.67 
In the wake of 9/11, Congress passed the September 11th Victim 
Compensation Fund of 2001, providing another avenue of redress for 
terrorism victims, albeit victims of one specific attack.68  Then, seeking 
to broaden the availability of redress, Congress enacted the Terrorism 
Risk Insurance Act of 2002 (TRIA), which allows plaintiffs to satisfy 
would, in particular, impede the effectiveness of such prohibitions and regulations upon 
financial transactions.  Therefore, pursuant to section 2002(f) of H.R. 3244, the 
“Victim's of Trafficking and Violence Protection Act of 2000,” I hereby waive 
subsection (f)(1) of section 1601 of title 28, United States Code, in the interest of 
national security. 
65 Fed. Reg. 66483 (2000). 
 65. Victims of Trafficking and Violence Protection Act of 2000, Pub. L. No.106-386, § 2002, 
114 Stat. 1541 (2000).  The bill provided for compensatory damages of the eleven judgments to be 
paid out of United States Treasury funds, with one exception.  Id.  The plaintiffs in Alejandre v. 
Cuba were to be paid out of Cuba’s frozen assets – a move which proved controversial.  Id.  The 
other judgments were all against Iran.  Id.  After these judgments were paid (up to a maximum of 
$400 million), the United States was to seek its own reimbursement from Iran.  Id.  Under the 
statutory scheme, plaintiffs could choose to accept 110% of their compensatory damages if they 
relinquished enforcing their judgments in court; or 100% of their compensatory damages if they 
relinquished the right to attach assets such as diplomatic property and frozen assets.  Id.  Those who 
accepted the latter option could continue to seek court enforcement of their punitive damage awards.  
Id.  In 2001, the United States government disbursed about half of Cuba’s $193.5 million in blocked 
assets to pay the three plaintiffs.  Taylor, Another Front, supra note 50, at 541.  This act engendered 
much criticism because there has been no compensation for the 6,000 claims determined valid by 
the Foreign Claims Settlement Commission in the late 1960s against Cuba for death, injury, and 
expropriation during and after Castro's takeover.  Strauss, Enlisting, supra note 61, at 733-34.  The 
U.S. Treasury has paid approximately $350 million to satisfy the judgments against Iran. Taylor, 
Another Front, supra note 50, at 541. 
 66. These judgments include Alejandre v. Republic of Cuba, 996 F. Supp.1239 (S.D. 
Fla.1997), Flatow v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 999 F. Supp. 2d 1 (D.D.C.1998), Cicippio v. Islamic 
Republic of Iran, 18 F. Supp. 2d 62 (D.D.C. 1998), Anderson v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 90 F. 
Supp. 2d 107 (D.D.C. 2000), Eisenfeld v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9545 
(D.D.C.July 11, 2000), Higgins v. Islamic Republic of Iran, No. 99-377, 2000 WL 33674311 
(D.D.C. Sept. 21, 2000); Sutherland v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 151 F.Supp.2d 27 (D.D.C. 2001), 
Polhill v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15322 (D.D.C. Aug. 23, 2001), Jenco v. 
Islamic Republic of Iran, 154 F. Supp. 2d 27 (D.D.C. 2001), Wagner v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 
172 F. Supp. 2d 128 (D.D.C. 2001), and Stenholm v. Islamic Republic of Iran (not yet decided). 
 67. See Victims of Trafficking and Violence Protection Act § 2002. 
 68. September 11th Victim Compensation Fund of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-42 § 406(b), 115 
Stat. 230, 240 (2001).  This legislation created a government claims process as a means to redress, 
rather than individual litigation.  See Seth N. Stratton, Taking Terrorists to Court: A Practical 
Evaluation of Civil Suits Against Terrorists Under the Anti-Terrorism Act, 9 SUFFOLK J. TRIAL & 
APP. ADVOC. 27 (2004); Georgene Vairo, Remedies for Victims of Terrorism, 35 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 
1265, 1273-85 (2002) (explaining provisions of the legislation). 
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their judgments against terrorist states or their agencies and 
instrumentalities by attaching frozen assets.69  TRIA limited the 
presidential waiver of the 1998 Amendments so that the president must 
make an “asset-by-asset” determination that waiver is necessary.70  The 
State Department opposed this legislation, but it passed nonetheless.71  
TRIA was the only source of the compensation received by the plaintiff 
in Iran v. Elahi.72 
B. The Problem with Enforcement 
1. International Law and Foreign Policy Implications 
There are powerful, unspoken foreign policy reasons that may 
explain why the Supreme Court effectively barred attachment under the 
1610(a)(7) foreign state provision in Iran v. Elahi.73  The exercise of the 
FSIA terrorist state exception may very well be a violation of 
international law, including customary international law and various 
treaties.74  The Ninth Circuit itself, before authorizing the attachment, 
 69. Terrorism Risk Insurance Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107- 297, § 201, 116 Stat. 2322, 2337 
(codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1610 (2002)).  Section 201(a) specifically allows the attachment (“(a) In 
general.-Notwithstanding any other provision of law, and except as provided in subsection (b)[of 
this note], in every case in which a person has obtained a judgment against a terrorist party on a 
claim based upon an act of terrorism, or for which a terrorist party is not immune under section 
1605(a)(7) of title 28, United States Code, the blocked assets of that terrorist party (including the 
blocked assets of any agency or instrumentality of that terrorist party) shall be subject to execution 
or attachment in aid of execution in order to satisfy such judgment to the extent of any 
compensatory damages for which such terrorist party has been adjudged liable.”). 
 70. Terrorism Risk Insurance Act § 201(b)(1).  See also Strauss, Enlisting, supra note 61, at 
735 (noting that TRIA has provided relief to at least one plaintiff with a judgment against Iran, 
namely in Hegna v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14039 (N.D. Ill. 2003)).  Elahi 
recovered partial payment under TRIA. See infra note 162 and accompanying text. 
 71. Taylor, Another Front, supra note 50, at 544 (regarding the State Departments efforts to 
thwart attachment). 
 72. See infra note 174. 
 73. Taylor, Another Front, supra note 50, at 544.  Taylor says that the most significant 
problem with the practice of permitting suit against foreign states is that it allows the courts to 
intrude on foreign policy.  Id. 
 74. BANKAS, STATE IMMUNITY, supra note 10, at 293.  Bankas states that the FSIA 
attachment immunity exception authorizing a plaintiff to claim state-owned property used for 
commercial activity in the United States, regardless of whether the property is the subject of the 
claim, runs counter to prevailing customary international law.  Id.  He believes that such attachment 
may violate various international agreements such as the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic 
Relations, The Vienna Convention on Consular Relations and the General Convention on Privileges 
and Immunities of the United Nations.  Id. at 293–95.  He specifically refers to § 1610(a)(7) and 
(b)(2) as “draconian.”  Id. at 294.  In the next sentence, Bankas says that foreign state defendants 
should welcome the fact that the statutory amendments can be neutralized by presidential waiver, 
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noted the “historical and international antipathy to executing against a 
foreign state’s property.”75  From the perspective of international law, it 
is at least clear that if the United States authorizes the attachment of 
diplomatic property it will violate the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic 
Relations and the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Consular 
Relations.76  Absolute attachment immunity in domestic law is prevalent 
worldwide.77  Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter provides for 
attachment and other enforcement mechanisms only when a nation has 
violated international law.78  When properly set within this legal 
landscape, it becomes clear that the 1610(a)(7) extension of U.S. 
which President Clinton exercised when Congress attempted to explicitly authorize the attachment 
of diplomatic assets in 1998.  Id. 
 75. Iran v. Cubic Defense Systems, Inc. 385 F.3d 1206, 1219 (9th Cir. 2004). 
 76. Taylor, Another Front, supra note 50, at 547.  Vienna Convention on Diplomatic 
Relations and Optional Protocol on Disputes, Apr. 18, 1961, 23 U.S.T. 3227, T.I.A.S. No. 7502. 
Article 22 requires that a host country protect the property of diplomatic missions and Article 45(a) 
says that if diplomatic relations are broken off, the host country must protect the diplomatic mission, 
its property and archives, even in the event of armed conflict.  Id. 
 77. Even so Glannon and Atik write that, “We are not aware of any other nation that would 
similarly subject foreign states to private party actions in its domestic courts for extraterritorial 
acts.”  Joseph W. Glannon & Jeffery Atik, Politics and Personal Jurisdiction: Suing State Sponsors 
of Terrorism Under the 1996 Amendments to the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, 87 GEO. L. J.  
675, 701-02 (1999) [hereinafter Glannon & Atik, Politics and Personal Jurisdiction]. 
 78. HAZEL QC. FOX, The LAW OF STATE IMMUNITY: FOUNDATIONS OF PUBLIC 
INTERNATIONAL LAW, 28-29 (2002) [hereinafter FOX, THE LAW OF STATE IMMUNITY].  Fox 
explains that: 
The application by one State of forcible measures of constraint against the conduct or 
property of another State is an unfriendly act generally prohibited by international law, 
except where that state itself has contravened international law.  Thus exceptionally, 
under Chapter VII of the UN Charter in respect of threat to or breach of international 
peace and security, the United Nations Security Council may authorize the application of 
sanctions against a State, and those sanctions may take the form of national measures of 
constraint against a State’s property, as with the UN-ordered bloc of Iraq’s assets 
following the invasion of Kuwait.  Such orders may also be made to protect a State 
which itself is disabled, as with the freezing orders in respect of assets of the State of 
Kuwait.  Unilateral countermeasures against another State may only be taken by way of 
reprisal against another State for violation of international law, such as the US’ freezing 
of assets in response to the seizure of US diplomats by Iran in 1979. 
Id.  This view coincides with that of the scholars who recommend the ICC as the only appropriate 
forum for enforcement against terrorist states.  Taylor, Another Front, supra note 50, at 556. 
Victims would have a greater likelihood of recovery in such a forum because judgments could be 
enforced in any state where the defendant has assets.  Id.   Hoye, Fighting Fire, supra note 9, at 
149-50 (advocating the ICC as a potential site of a “credible, independent and global compensation 
system.”).  The FSIA attachment provisions related to terrorist acts against United States citizens do 
not present the type of sovereign reprisal that Fox says is legal by international law.  FOX, THE LAW 
OF STATE IMMUNITY at 28-9.  With these statutes, a private citizen is arguably bringing the 
“reprisal,” which is subject to the individual motivations and whims of the private litigant. 28 
U.S.C. § 1610. 
14
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jurisdiction rests on much shakier ground than perhaps Congress 
considered. 
Likewise, the egregious jurisdictional reach may negatively impact 
foreign relations and foreign policy by presenting problems of 
reciprocity.  Few other countries have enacted terrorist state exceptions 
to their foreign sovereign immunity doctrines and the ones who have 
enacted such provisions have done so in response to U.S. suits naming 
them as defendants.79  The United States must consider the burdensome 
effect of opening itself up to reciprocal suits in other nations, as the 
United States has carried out many operations in foreign nations 
susceptible to the characterization of “terrorist.”80 
Similarly, the United States may offend other nations by allowing 
suits to proceed in which that particular state may have an interest.81  
Presenting a related problem, the existence of outstanding judgments 
against terrorist states may make it more difficult to improve relations 
with these states in the future.82  Scholars have suggested that the only 
venue competent to execute against the property of a state may be the 
International Court of Justice or another similar venue with international 
backing.83  Fox notes that even when it may be legal to attach a foreign 
state’s property within a forum state, the forum state may be reluctant to 
authorize such attachment due to the political ramifications,84 and this 
could be the case in Iran v. Elahi. 
Besides the history of the doctrine working against attachment, 
 79. Iran and Cuba have already enacted reciprocal policies.  Taylor, Another Front, supra 
note 50, at 549-50. 
 80. Taylor, Another Front, supra note 50, at 549.  Taylor explains that the United States has 
been responsible for military operations around the world many have labeled as “terrorist” in nature 
so it should be unsurprising if the United States were to find itself named as defendant and hauled 
before a foreign court.  Id. 
 81. Glannon and Atik offer the example of the litigation of the families of the Lockerbie 
bombing victims.  Glannon & Atik, Politics and Personal Jurisdiction, supra note 77, at 701-02.  
They write, “[T]he United Kingdom may decide that it has a greater stake in the Lockerbie case 
than has the United States because the Pan Am flight had departed London and exploded over 
Scotland, killing many on the ground as well as those on board the airliner.  Consequently, the 
United Kingdom might resent U.S. proceedings and refuse enforcement.”  Id.  Also on the question 
of reciprocity,  Bankas writes that: 
In fact, it there is more involved in the enforcement process . . . and state practice over 
the years has been obscured by conflicting municipal court decisions, and it would 
appear that those states which have totally embraced the restrictive immunity are hesitant 
and apprehensive in having it applied at the enforcement phase, for fear of retaliation or 
similar action from other states. 
BANKAS, STATE IMMUNITY, supra note 10, at 294. 
 82. Taylor, Another Front, supra note 50, at 546. 
 83. See supra note 78. 
 84. FOX, THE LAW OF STATE IMMUNITY, supra note 78, at 29. 
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there is the complex history of litigation between the United States and 
Iran: in return for the release of United States hostages during the 1979 
Iranian hostage crisis, the President signed an executive agreement 
terminating litigation in U.S. courts between U.S. citizens and Iran.85 
 85. Exec. Order No. 12,294, § 3, 46 Fed. Reg. 14,111, at 14,111 (1981).  Iran v. Elahi would 
not be covered by the agreement because the Tribunal only hears claims which became ripe before 
January 19, 1981.  Id.  Nancy Amoury Combs provides further background on the situation: 
  Prior to Iran's 1979 Islamic Revolution, the United States and Iran were close allies. 
For years, Iran purchased vast quantities of United States military equipment, and during 
the 1970s in particular, Iran sought American technology, equipment, and investment for 
a variety of large-scale projects such as road construction, factory modernization, and 
communications systems.  Consequently, by the late 1970s, Iran was home to a 
considerable number of American business interests, and more than 40,000 American 
citizens.  But the Islamic Revolution in Iran brought those commercial relations to an 
abrupt end and by the end of 1978, most Americans living in Iran had fled the country. 
The new government established by the Ayatollah Khomeini instituted many 'reforms' 
that would have severe consequences for the American companies that had been doing 
business there.  For instance, it nationalized numerous industries, expropriated the 
property of American corporations, and cancelled government contracts with American 
companies.  
  These events were no doubt troubling to the affected Americans, but few took any 
legal action to recover their losses.  Then, on November 4, 1979, militant Iranian 
students stormed the United States Embassy in Tehran and took the American nationals 
there hostage.  President Carter soon responded by, inter alia, blocking the transfer of all 
Iranian funds in American banks, both in the United States and abroad.  He froze more 
than $12 billion, and the news of these frozen assets sent many of the victimized 
American companies to United States courts bringing breach-of-contract and 
expropriation claims, and often seeking attachment of the frozen assets.  By the time the 
hostages were released in early 1981, more than 400 suits against Iran were pending in 
American courts, with approximately $4 billion of Iranian assets the subject of pre-
judgment attachments.  
  Thus, when Iran and the United States began to negotiate in earnest to resolve the 
hostage crisis in the autumn of 1980, each state had something the other wanted. The 
United States wanted its citizens released.  Iran wanted its money back and wanted to get 
out from what it viewed as burdensome litigation before American judges.  However, the 
United States could not simply return Iran's assets upon the release of the hostages 
because most of the assets had been judicially attached.  Consequently, after lengthy and 
complicated negotiations, the two countries concluded an agreement in January 1981--
the Algiers Declarations--which ordered the release of the hostages, the return of most of 
Iran's money, and the creation of the Iran-United States Claims Tribunal.  The Tribunal 
has jurisdiction over claims then outstanding by nationals of each country against the 
government of the other; claims between the two  governments arising out of contracts 
between them for the purchase and sale of goods and services; and any subsequent 
disputes between the two governments concerning the interpretation or performance of 
the Algiers Declarations. 
Nancy Amoury Combs, Diplomatic Adjudication, 2 CHI. J. INT’L L. 267, 267-69 (2001) [hereinafter 
Combs, Diplomatic Adjudication].  See generally Lisa D. Goekjian, Jurisdiction Under the FSIA 
and the Algiers Accord, A Loose Application: Foremost-McKesson, Inc. v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 
59 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1311 (1991) (explaining the operation of Iran-United States Claims 
Tribunal in reference to the FSIA). 
16
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Over 3,500 claims have been submitted to the Iran-United States Claims 
Tribunal, created as an alternative to the litigation.86  Within the 
Tribunal, Iran has employed many underhanded tactics, such as stalling, 
to delay and frustrate settlement.87  In light of this tempestuous history 
and uncertain future, it is a reasonable conclusion that neither the 
Supreme Court, nor Elahi, would search exhaustively for reasons to 
apply this controversial foreign attachment provision of the FSIA in Iran 
v. Elahi.88 
2. Constitutional Questions 
Scholars have argued that the FSIA raises two constitutional 
problems, namely that immunity determinations are political questions89 
and that the 1996 Amendments permits suits against defendants without 
the requisite “minimum contacts” for due process.90  A claim presents a 
nonjusticiable political question when it fits within one of the categories 
set forth in Baker v. Carr.91  Connors first argues that most immunity 
determinations present political questions92 because of a “textually 
demonstrable constitutional commitment”93 to the executive branch.94  
 86. Peter W. Adler, The U.S.-Iran Accords and the Taking Clause of the Fifth Amendment, 68 
VA. L. REV. 1537, 1537 (1982). 
 87. Combs, Diplomatic Adjudication, supra note 85, at 269-70. 
 88. See infra notes 149-164. 
 89. Connors, Separation of Powers, supra note 32, at 217-24. 
 90. See infra notes 104-105. 
 91. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962) (“Prominent on the surface of any case held to 
involve a political question is found a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue 
to a coordinate political department; or a lack of judicially discoverable and manageable standards 
for resolving it; or the impossibility of deciding without an initial policy determination of a kind 
clearly for nonjudicial discretion; or the impossibility of a court's undertaking independent 
resolution without expressing a lack of respect due coordinate branches of government; or an 
unusual need for unquestioning adherence to a political decision already made; or the potentiality of 
embarrassment from multifarious pronouncements by various departments on one question.”). 
 92. Connors, Separation of Powers, supra note 32, at 222. The  FSIA cases which do not 
present political questions are simple contract cases.  Id. at 227-29. 
 93. See supra note 91 and accompanying text. 
 94. Connors, Separation of Powers, supra note 32, at 222.  Connors explains that the 
“Constitution gives the Executive branch power to receive foreign ambassadors and to recognize 
foreign states, thereby conferring upon them all the rights and immunities granted to foreign states 
to U.S. law, including foreign sovereign immunity.”  Id. at 222-23.  He says that the judicial branch 
usurps the power of the executive branch when it makes foreign sovereign immunity 
determinations.  Id. at 223.  Connors describes the effects of this infringement as such: 
Thus, despite its purpose to depoliticize sovereign immunity decisions, the FSIA 
frustrates that end by encouraging similar cases to be subjected to the foreign policy 
whims of different judges.  Whereas the common law encouraged executive branch 
encroachment of the judicial function, the FSIA, welcomes judicial infringement of 
executive foreign policy prerogative.  To the extent foreign policy does influence FSIA 
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Second, he argues that immunity determinations present political 
questions when they lack “judicially manageable standards”95 through 
which to resolve the case.96  Third, Connors argues that these 
determinations risk “embarrassment from multifarious 
pronouncements,”97 because the executive and judicial branch may 
differ on their opinions regarding immunity.98  It makes sense that courts 
are uncomfortable in this territory – but, it does not help that they do not 
clearly say so in Elahi.  The executive branch is clearly involved in that 
they name the states listed as terrorists,99 but the extent of its influence is 
unclear.  At least one FSIA suit has recently been dismissed as 
presenting a nonjusticiable political question on the circuit court level.100  
decisions, the federal judiciary exceeds its constitutional power and disregards its 
primary function of guaranteeing litigants due process of law by denying uniform 
treatment to foreign states, particularly in cases “where socioeconomic norms conflict as 
to whether a given activity is commercial or governmental.” 
Id. at 215-16. In Rein, the Supreme Court rejected challenges on this ground because Congress 
wrote the terrorist state exception so that it applies to states that the State Department has designated 
as state sponsors of terrorism, thus, the decision is left up to the executive branch.  Rein v. Socialist 
People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, 162 F.3d 748, 762-63 (2d Cir. 1998) (rejecting the argument that 
there has been an unconstitutional delegation of the core legislative power to determine the subject 
matter jurisdiction of the federal courts); Daliberti v. Republic of Iraq, 97 F. Supp. 2d 38 (D.D.C. 
2000). 
 95. See supra note 91 and accompanying text.  
 96. Connors, Separation of Powers, supra note 32, at 223.  Connors argues that the FSIA 
presents inadequate guidance on “commercial activity” and that courts must refrain from 
adjudication on any case that may involve this. Id. 
 97. See supra note 91 and accompanying text. 
 98. Connors, Separation of Powers, supra note 32, at 223 (arguing that instead of protecting 
one branch from usurpation by another, this provision protects all branches of the federal 
government). 
 99. See supra note 47 and accompanying text. 
 100. Whiteman v. Dorotheum GMBH & Co., 431 F.3d 57 (2d Cir. 2005).  See generally 
Separation of Powers – Foreign Sovereign Immunity – Second Circuit Uses Political Question 
Doctrine to Hold Claims Against Austria Nonjusticiable under Foreign Sovereign Immunity Act –
Whiteman v. Dorotheum GMBH & Co., 431 F.3d 57 (2d Cir. 2005), 119 HARV. L. REV. 2292 
(2006) [hereinafter Separation of Powers].  This article explains that the United States offered a 
statement of interest in the case, on which the outcome ultimately turned.  Id. at 2292.  In this case, 
plaintiffs sued Austria for compensation for assets liquidated during the Nazi era.  Whiteman, 431 
F.3d at 59-60.  While the case unfolded, the United States entered an executive agreement with 
Austria to establish an alternative dispute resolution system for these cases.  The United States 
offered its statement of interest in the case because the only obstacle to implementation of the 
system was this outstanding case.  Whiteman, 431 F.3d at 59.  While the court dismissed the action 
because of this foreign policy concern presented by the executive branch, it avoided creating 
precedent which would establish pure deference to the executive branch in FSIA cases.  Separation 
of Powers at 2292.  It argues that the court acted rightly by reinforcing “principles of deference 
present in existing doctrines” instead of “creating a new doctrine of ‘executive deference’” because 
of the lack of clarity presented in recent Supreme Court decisions.  Id. at 2295.  In Iran v. Elahi, the 
court did not have a clear foreign policy decision in its hands; however, it did solicit an amicus brief 
from the United States before deciding whether or not to grant certiorari.  Iran v. Elahi, 544 U.S. 
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Although it is outside the scope of this Comment, the judges in 
Whiteman v. Dorotheum GMBH & Co. applied a murky, emerging 
doctrine of “case-specific deference” in order to shed light on this 
question.101  
While no brief or opinion ever mentions this issue, there are 
elements of such deference to the executive branch in Iran v. Elahi.  For 
example, the Court requested an amicus brief from the United States 
before deciding whether or not to grant certiorari.102  Later, the United 
States intervened after the case was remanded to the Ninth Circuit.103  
There is a pattern of interaction between the different branches of 
government that the Supreme Court could have taken the opportunity to 
clarify – but did not. 
There is another constitutional argument that the FSIA terrorist 
state exception presents problems with “minimum contacts” because it 
can confer jurisdiction over litigation resulting from acts occurring off of 
U.S. soil.104  However, Professors Glannon and Atik would argue that 
there is no problem here, because the United States Constitution was not 
contemplated to provide protection to foreign nations – but to protect 
individuals and U.S. states.105 
IV. IRAN V. ELAHI 
A. Background Facts 
On the morning of October 23, 1990, Dr. Cyrus Elahi, a United 
States citizen106 and champion of democracy in Iran,107 was shot eight 
998 (2005). 
 101. Separation of Powers, supra note 100, at 2296 (citing Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 124 S. 
Ct. 2739, 2766 (2004) and Republic of Austria v. Altmann, 124 S. Ct. 2240, 2255 (2004)).  The 
author noted that the “case-specific deference” doctrine was only referenced in a footnote within the 
forty page Sosa opinion and a single paragraph in the Altmann opinion.  Id. 
 102. See infra note 151 and accompanying text. 
 103. See infra note 162 and accompanying text. 
 104. Daliberti v. Republic of Iraq, 97 F. Supp. 2d 38, 48-49 (D.D.C. 2000).  In Daliberti, Iraq 
unsuccessfully argued that “the FSIA as a whole, or at least the state sponsored terrorism exception, 
violates due process by abrogating the minimum contacts requirement that is always necessary for 
the exercise of personal jurisdiction.” Id. 
 105. Glannon & Atik, Politics and Personal Jurisdiction, supra note 77, at 688.  The terrorist 
state exceptions allow for states to be sued for actions which could never conceivably be argued to 
bear the requisite “minimum contacts.”  Id.  However, “[t]he Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment Due 
Process Clauses were meant to protect individuals from capricious government action, rather than to 
protect foreign, coequal sovereigns.”  Id. at 692. 
 106. Elahi v. Iran, 124 F. Supp. 2d 97, 103 (D.D.C. 2000). 
 107. Id. at 102-03.  See infra note 114 and accompanying text. 
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times by an assassin using a gun with a silencer while on the steps of his 
apartment building in Paris, France.108  Dr. Elahi’s brother, Dr. Dariush 
Elahi, sought redress for the vicious attack by filing a wrongful death 
action against Iran and its Ministry of Defense in a United States district 
court.109 
Before the Iranian Revolution of 1979, Dr. Elahi was a political 
science professor at the National University in Tehran.110  Because of his 
work as an education advisor to the deposed Shah, Dr. Elahi was placed 
on a list of two hundred individuals designated as official enemies of the 
Khomeini regime.111  The regime issued a fatwa calling for Elahi’s 
assassination.112  Elahi spent a period in hiding before he moved to the 
United States and obtained United States citizenship.113 
In 1986, Dr. Elahi’s close friend, Dr. Manouchehr Ganji established 
the Flag of Freedom Organization to promote democracy in Iran.114  Dr. 
Ganji located the organization’s headquarters in Paris and Dr. Elahi 
relocated to Paris and worked closely with Dr. Ganji as his second-in-
command.115 
Both United States and French authorities attributed Dr. Elahi’s 
death to the Iranian Ministry of Information and Security (MOIS), which 
operates the most highly developed assassination program in the Middle 
East.116  MOIS is also the largest intelligence agency in the Middle East, 
 108. Id. at 103. 
 109. Id. at 99. 
 110. Id. at 103. 
 111. Id. 
 112. Id. The court explained that a fatwa is religious edict, which authorizes a faithful Muslim 
to kill certain opponents of the Iranian regime.  Id.  Fatwas are not outwardly published, but they 
filter out to the public indirectly.  Id. 
 113. Id. 
 114. See MANOUCHEHR GANJI, DEFYING THE IRANIAN REVOLUTION: FROM A MINISTER TO 
THE SHAH TO A LEADER OF RESISTANCE 181–207 (2002).  Dr. Ganji established the organization in 
1986 after meeting with Prince Reza, a son of the Shah, who inspired him to form an organization to 
promote a democratic and pluralistic Iran, which would respect the fundamental rights of its 
citizens.  Id.  The Front for the Liberation of Iran already existed in Paris, but its leader was aging 
and the organization had been diminishing its activities.  Id.  Dr. Ganji and Dr. Elahi took over the 
headquarters for their new organization.  Id.  They worked to promote a non-violent regime change 
in Iran through radio broadcasts, the publication of booklets, information gathering, and maintaining 
contact with opposition leaders within Iran.  Id.   They supported boycotts, strikes and other public 
demonstrations within Iran and abroad.  Id.  Dr. Ganji and Dr. Elahi directed their supporters within 
Iran to spread the idea of non-cooperation with the regime and to carry out acts of non-violent 
demonstration and protest.  Id.  In one notable campaign, the Flag of Freedom booklets instructed 
anyone dissatisfied with the regime to write the word “NO” (or “NAA” in Persian) on any available 
public surface in Iran.  Id.  Dr. Ganji writes that millions of “NAA” appeared on surfaces in Iran and 
that they are still being created as of the time of the book’s publication.  Id. 
 115. Iran, 124 F. Supp 2d at 103. 
 116. Id. at 101.  Note that in the appeals, MOIS is renamed the Ministry of Defense (MOD).  
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boasting an annual budget of up to $500 million.117  After hearing the 
case, the Paris Supreme Criminal Court convicted Mojtaba Mashadi and 
Hoseyn Yazdanseta, agents of MOIS, of conspiracy to commit terrorist 
acts.118 
Dariush Elahi, brother of Cyrus Elahi and executor of his estate, 
sued the Islamic Republic of Iran and MOIS for the wrongful death of 
Cyrus in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia.119  
The district court granted jurisdiction under the terrorist state exception 
of the FSIA, which allows foreign states and their agencies to be sued 
for personal injury or death to American nationals which results from 
state-sponsored terrorist activities, such as extra-judicial killing.120  The 
district court considered it “uncontradicted” that the murder of Dr. Elahi 
was executed by agents of the Ministry of Defense at the direction of the 
Islamic Republic of Iran.121 
Both defendants failed to enter an appearance before the district 
court entered a default judgment against them.122  Compensatory 
damages were awarded to Dariush Elahi in the amount of $11 million 
and punitive damages totaling $300 million were leveled against the 
defendants, both of which the defendants failed to pay.123 
As the district court noted, Iran and its agencies were not strangers 
to the American judicial system.124  The Iranian Ministry of Defense had 
filed a petition to confirm an arbitration award amounting to nearly 
$3,000,000 against Cubic Defense Systems, Inc. in the United States 
District Court for the Southern District of California and obtained the 
confirmation on December 7, 1998.125  As a judgment creditor, Dariush 
Iran v. Cubic Defense Systems, Inc., 385 F.3d 1206, 1206 (9th Cir. 2004). 
 117. Iran, 124 F. Supp 2d at 101.  It should be noted that the district court awarded Elahi 
punitive damages totaling $300 million – an amount quite significant in that it had the potential to 
decimate MOIS’s annual budget.  Id. at 114. 
 118. Id. at 104-05.  According to an Iran Press Service 2001 article, a Paris criminal court 
eventually acquitted Mojitaba Mashadi for Elahi’s murder because the prosecutor decided to 
examine the case as a political murder.  Iranj Fatemi, Paris Criminal Court Cleared Mashadi of 
Charges in Elahi’s Murder, IRAN PRESS SERVICE, June 29, 2001, available at http://www.iran-
press-service.com/articles_2001/jun_2001/elahi_court_ends_29601.htm.  Mashadi said in 
depositions that he worked for the Iranian Intelligence Ministry.  Id.  The article tersely notes that 
Hoseyn Yazdanseta died under “mysterious circumstances” after being released from jail.  Id. 
 119. Iran, 124 F. Supp 2d at 99. 
 120. Id. 28 U.S.C. §1605(a)(7) (1996).  See supra notes 38-42 and accompanying text 
(regarding the terrorist state exception). 
 121. Iran, 124 F. Supp 2d at 105. 
 122. Id. at 99. 
 123. Id. at 112-14. 
 124. Id. at 100. 
 125. Iran v. Cubic Defense Systems Inc., 29 F. Supp. 2d 1168, 1170-72 (1998).  In 1977, Iran 
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Elahi and another creditor, Stephen Flatow, filed notices of lien against 
Iran’s judgment against Cubic.126  The Iranian Ministry of Defense then 
initiated a petition in the same court to determine whether or not the 
judgment was immune from attachment.127 
B. District Court Ruled for Elahi on Waiver of Immunity 
The district court evaluated a number of arguments from Iran that 
the judgment was immune under the FSIA.128  After dismissing Iran’s 
arguments, the court contended that Iran implicitly waived general 
jurisdictional immunity under Section 1605(a)(1) of the FSIA.129  The 
court based this argument on two grounds.130  First, it cited Ninth Circuit 
precedent stating that Section 1605(a)(1) waiver of immunity is made 
when a foreign state submits to arbitration in another country.131  
Second, the court believed that Iran’s Ministry of Defense (“MOD”) had 
waived its immunity by petitioning to confirm the award.132  It cited 
precedent stating that “filing pleadings in federal court without raising 
the issue of sovereign immunity is an implicit waiver under Section 
1605(a)(1).”133  The court then elaborated that the Ministry of Defense, 
“could not have obtained the judgment against Cubic without” giving up 
some of its immunity and, “reason now dictates that it cannot now raise 
the same shield to protect the judgment.”134 
contracted with Cubic to purchase an Air Combat Maneuvering Range.  Id.  Due to the Iranian 
Revolution, Cubic withdrew its specialists and failed to deliver the Air Combat Maneuvering 
Range.  Id.  Pursuant to their contract, Cubic and Iran arbitrated the dispute in the International 
Chamber of Commerce in Switzerland. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae at 4, Iran v. 
Elahi, 546 U.S. 450 (2006) (No. 04-1095), 2005 WL 3477863. 
 126. Iran v. Cubic Defense Systems Inc., 236 F. Supp. 2d 1140, 1143 (S.D.Cal. 2002). 
 127. Id. at 1140. 
 128. Id. at 1144-52. 
 129. Id. at 1151 (citing 28 U.S.C. 1605(a)(1) (“A foreign state shall not be immune from the 
jurisdiction of courts of the United States . . . in which the foreign state has waived is immunity 
either explicitly or by implication.”)). 
 130. Id. 
 131. Id. (citing In re Republic of Philippines, 309 F.3d 1143 (9th Cir. 2002)). 
 132. Id. (citing Joseph v. Office of the Consulate General of Nigeria, 830 F.2d 1018, 1021 (9th 
Cir. 1987)). 
 133. Id. 
 134. Id.  The district court determined that the FSIA supported this ruling.  Id.   Section 1609 
of the FSIA holds that property of a foreign state is immune from attachment only subject to 
existing international agreements to which the United States is a party.  Id. (citing 28 U.S.C. 1609 
(1976) (“Subject to existing international agreements to which the United States is a party at the 
time of enactment of this Act the property in the United States of a foreign state shall be immune 
from attachment arrest and execution. . . .”)).  The court then looked to the Convention on the 
Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards and found that judgments confirming an 
arbitration award shall have the same force and effect, in all respects, as, and be subject to all 
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C. The Ninth Circuit Affirmed on the Agency or Instrumentality 
Exception 
Iran appealed to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals,135 which 
overturned the reasoning of the lower court, but affirmed the judgment 
on the alternative grounds that it falls within the exception to immunity 
set out in Section 1610(b)(2) of the FSIA – the agency/instrumentality 
exception.136  Iran’s appeal was consolidated with that of Stephen 
Flatow, who also attempted to place a lien on the Cubic judgment under 
circumstances very similar to Elahi’s.137 
The Ninth Circuit dismissed the waiver argument accepted by the 
lower court and138 determined that Elahi’s attachment was valid through 
1610(b)(2).139  Applying the two elements of the test, the court decided 
that the judgment would not be immune under 1610(b)(2) if MOD 
provisions relating to a judgment in an action in federal court, and it may be enforced as if entered 
in an action in the court in which it is entered.  Id.  The district court reasoned that this provision 
entitled Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 64 to come into effect which allows for the attachment of a 
debtor’s property by judgment creditors.  Id. at 1152.  The court, therefore, determined that Elahi’s 
lien was valid.  Id. 
 135. Iran v. Cubic Defense Systems, Inc., 385 F.3d 1206, 1206 (9th Cir. 2004). 
 136. Id. at 1219 (referencing § 1610(b)(2), which states: “[A]ny property in the United States 
of an agency or instrumentality of a foreign state engaged in commercial activity in the United 
States shall not be immune from attachment in aid of execution, or from execution, upon a judgment 
entered by a court of the United States or of a State after the effective date of this act, if – (2) the 
judgment relates to a claim for which the agency or instrumentality is not immune by virtue of 
section 1605(a)(2), (3), (5), or (7) or 1605(b) of this chapter, regardless of whether the property is or 
was involved in the act upon which the claim is based.”).  See supra notes 38-42 and accompanying 
text (regarding the terrorist state exception to the FSIA). 
 137. Cubic, 385 F.3d at 1210.  Stephen Flatow’s daughter, Alisa Michelle Flatow, was killed in 
a terrorist attack in Jerusalem on April 10, 1995 attributed to Iran and its Ministry of Defense. 
Flatow v. Iran, 999 F. Supp. 1, 6-9 (D.D.C. 1998).  Flatow sued Iran and its Ministry of Defense.  
Id. at 7-8.  Both defendants failed to enter an appearance and a default judgment was entered against 
them in the amount of $20,000,000 in compensatory damages and $250,000,000 in punitive 
damages.  Id. at 32-33; Cubic, 385 F.3d at 1210.  Flatow attempted to attach the Cubic judgment.  
Id.  When Iran petitioned the district court for a determination on the judgment’s immunity, the 
court granted the immunity with regards to Flatow because he had waived his claims to Iran by 
choosing to collect under § 2002 of the Victims of Trafficking and Violence Protection Act of 2000.  
Id. at 1212-17.  The Ninth Circuit affirmed the lower court’s decision.  Id. at 1226.  Elahi did not 
accept any payments under this Act, so his claim could proceed.  Id. at 1217. 
 138. Cubic, 385 F.3d 1206, 1218.  The court explained that the lower court had overlooked the 
distinction in the FSIA between general sovereign immunity and attachment immunity.  Id. at 1217-
18.  MOD conceded that it waived its general sovereign immunity.  Id. at 1218.  The Ninth Circuit 
held that a waiver of general sovereign immunity does not also constitute a waiver of immunity 
from attachment.  Id.  The court noted that before the existence of the FSIA there was precedent 
holding that a waiver of general immunity was not a waiver of attachment immunity and the FSIA 
did nothing to change this rule.  Id.  See Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law of the 
United States § 456(1)(b) (1987). 
 139. Cubic, 385 F.3d at 1221-22. 
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participated in commercial activity within the United States and Elahi’s 
judgment related to a claim that the MOD is not immune of through 
Section 1605(a)(7).140  The court found the Cubic judgment to be 
“commercial activity” because it emerged from a dispute regarding a 
contract to purchase military equipment.141  Also, the court found that 
Elahi’s judgment related to a claim that MOD is not immune through the 
terrorist state exception (1605(a)(7)).142 
The Ninth Circuit considered Section 1603(a) of the FSIA in its 
reasoning over whether the Ministry of Defense qualified as a foreign 
state for the purposes of 1605(a)(7).143  The court wrote that Section 
1603(a) defines the term “foreign state” to include “a political 
subdivision of a foreign state or an agency or instrumentality;” therefore, 
“under 1605(a)(7), once a foreign state has engaged in state-sponsored 
terrorist activity, all of its agencies and instrumentalities are likewise not 
immune from jurisdiction.”144 
In addition, the court applied the five factors established by First 
National City Bank v. Banco Para El Comercio Exterior De Cuba 145 
 140. Id. at 1219-22.  The court said that the 28 U.S.C. § 1610(b)(2) exception to immunity 
from attachment applies if the underlying judgment relates to a claim for which the 
agency/instrumentality is not immune by 1605(a)(7) and the agency or instrumentality is engaged in 
commercial activity in the United States.  Id. 
 141. Id. at 1220.  28 U.S.C. § 1603(d) defines commercial activity as “either a regular course 
of commercial conduct or a particular commercial transaction or act.”  Id. at 1219 (quoting 28 
U.S.C. § 1603(d)).  28 U.S.C. § 1603(d) makes clear that the “commercial character of an activity 
shall be determined by reference to the nature of the course of conduct or particular transaction or 
act, rather than by reference to its purpose.”  Id. at 1219-20 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1603(d)).  In two 
previous decisions, the Ninth Circuit has found contracts to purchase military equipment to be 
commercial in nature.  Id. (citing Joseph v. Office of the Consulate Gen. of Nigeria, 830 F.2d 1018, 
1023 (9th Cir. 1987) and Park v. Shin, 313 F.3d 1138, 1145 (9th Cir. 2002)).  The court also cited 
other decisions in the Eighth and D.C. Circuits which had come to similar conclusions.  Id.  These 
decisions are also consistent with the legislative history of the FSIA.  Id.  The court cited the FSIA 
House Report at page 16 which stated that a foreign government’s contract to buy military 
provisions or equipment is commercial activity.  Id. (citing H.R. Rep. 94-1487, at 27 (1976), 
reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6604, 6626). 
 142. Cubic, 385 F.3d at 1220.  See 28 U.S.C. §1605(a)(7) (“A foreign state shall not be 
immune from the jurisdiction of courts of the United States or of the States in any case – (7)  not 
otherwise covered by paragraph (2), in which money damages are sought against a foreign state for 
personal injury or death that was caused by an act of torture, extrajudicial killing, aircraft sabotage, 
hostage taking or the provision (as defined in Section 2339A of title 18) for such an act if such act 
or provision of material support is engaged in by an official, employee or agent of such foreign state 
while acting within the scope of his or her office, employment, agency. . . .”).  The Act goes on to 
require that the foreign state was officially designated a state sponsor of terrorism and the victim is a 
United States national.  Id.  See also supra note 47 and accompanying text (regarding the official list 
of state sponsors of terrorism). 
 143. Cubic, 385 F.3d at 1220. 
 144. Id. 
 145. Cubic, 385 F.3d at 1221 (citing First National City Bank v. Banco Para El Comercio 
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and determined that the Ministry of Defense could be considered a 
“foreign state” under 1605(a)(7).146  In applying these factors, the Ninth 
Circuit ascertained that the Ministry of Defense is a central “organ” of 
the government of Iran and is subject to the direct control of the 
government.147  The court concluded that the MOD lacked immunity 
from attachment.148 
D. The Supreme Court Vacates and Remands for Determination on 
MOD’s  Status 
Iran appealed the Ninth Circuit’s judgment.149  The Supreme Court 
granted certiorari as to the question of whether property in the United 
States of a foreign state is immune from attachment under Section 
1610(a)(7).150  Before the Supreme Court granted certiorari, however, it 
requested an amicus brief from the Acting Solicitor General on behalf of 
the United States.151  He recommended that the Court grant certiorari 
and consider two questions (though he noted the existence of a third): 
whether the property of a foreign state is immune from attachment and 
Exterior De Cuba, 462 U.S. 611, 626-27 (1983), which states that there is a presumption that the 
foreign government and foreign agency shall have separate status, but that this presumption can be 
overcome through the weight of five factors, including: (1) the amount of the government’s 
economic control over the agency; (2) whether the agency’s profits go to the government; (3) the 
degree to which government officers handle the agency’s daily affairs; (4) whether the government 
derives the real benefit from the agency’s actions; (5) whether a separate status would give the 
foreign state undue benefit in United States courts). 
 146. Id. at 1221-22. 
 147. Id. 
 148. Id. 
 149. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Iran v. Elahi, 546 U.S. 450 (2006) (No. 04-1095), 2005 
WL 363255.  The MOD presented three main issues to the Supreme Court.  Id.  First, it argued that 
there is a need for a review of a circuit split regarding the attachment of foreign sovereign property 
under the FSIA and Bancec.  Id. at 13-20 (“But the Ninth Circuit's error appears to be doctrinally 
systemic and has been replicated in other decisions.”).  Second, MOD argued that there is a circuit 
split regarding the proper scope of the military property exception of the FSIA.  Id. at 20-22.  Third, 
there is confusion regarding whether a party can collaterally attack subject matter jurisdiction under 
the FSIA.  Id. at 22-30.  Within the first argument MOD argued that the Ninth Circuit contradicted 
itself by calling MOD a central organ of the government of Iran, yet allowing attachment under the 
1610(b)(2) provision for agencies or instrumentalities.  Id. at 14-15. 
 150. Iran, 546 U.S. at 451-452. 
 151. Iran v. Elahi, 544 U.S. 998, 998 (2005) (“The Acting Solicitor General is invited to file a 
brief in this case expressing the views of the United States.”).  The brief was written by the Legal 
Advisor to the Department of State, an attorney for the Department of Justice, the Solicitor General, 
and his deputy and assistant.  See Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae, Iran v. Elahi, 546 
U.S. 450 (2006) (No. 04-1095), 2005 WL 3477863.  The brief recommended that the court grant 
certiorari, vacate, and remand for a determination on whether 28 U.S.C. §1610(b)(2) attachment is 
appropriate.  Id. at 15-17. 
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whether the MOD is a foreign state or an agency or instrumentality,152 
but the Court granted the writ only as to the first question.153  It is 
notable that the United States wrote in its amicus brief that 1610(a) 
applies both to foreign sovereigns and their agencies and 
instrumentalities, but the Supreme Court did not analyze this 
argument.154 
The Supreme Court found that the 1610(a)(7) commercial activity 
attachment provision only applies to property “used” for a commercial 
activity.155  The Court tidily disposed of its analysis of the 1610(a)(7) 
argument by saying that 1610(a)(7) “does not contain the ‘engaged in 
 152. Id. at 8. The United States says the “threshold question” is whether or not MOD is a 
foreign state.  Id.  This is because the FSIA defines foreign state inclusively, as containing agencies 
and instrumentalities.  Id. at 2 (“Because the FSIA defines a ‘foreign state’ as including an ‘agency 
or instrumentality of a foreign state’ . . . ,  Section 1610(a) applies both to a foreign sovereign and to 
its agencies or instrumentalities . . . , Section 1610(b) provides ‘addition[al]’ bases for attachment 
that apply only to property of a foreign state's agencies or instrumentalities.”).  Therefore, the § 
1610(a)(7) exceptions can apply here.  Id. at 12.  Then, the United States goes on to state that “the 
question remains” whether MOD is also subject to the agency or instrumentality exceptions of § 
1610(a)(7).  Id. at 9.  This is because the FSIA defines agency or instrumentality restrictively, as a 
“separate legal person” that is an “organ” of a foreign state.  Id. at 9-10.  The United States argues 
that current case law suggests that there is at least a presumption that a defense ministry is not an 
agency or instrumentality because it would strip the state of its core sovereign functions.  Id. at 11 
(“But even if a foreign state conceivably might formally organize its ministry of defense as a 
‘separate legal person,’ . . . there should be, at a minimum, a strong presumption that it has not.”).  
Then, the United States said that the Ninth Circuit and the petitioner failed to address whether § 
1610(a)(7) or § 1610(b)(2) applied.  Id. at 11-12.  “Resolution of that question would require a 
determination whether merely obtaining a money judgment qualifies as ‘use[] for a commercial 
activity’” under 1610(a)(7).  Id. at 11.  The United States called this a “thornier” ground for 
attachment, but it did not come to a conclusion on its applicability.  Id. 
 153. Iran, 546 U.S. at 451-52. The court stated: 
 The Ministry filed a petition for certiorari asking us to review that decision.  The 
Solicitor General agrees with the Ministry that we should grant the writ but limited to the 
Ministry's Question 1, namely whether “the property of a foreign state stricto sensu, 
situated in the United States” is “immune from attachment . . . as provided in the Foreign 
Sovereign Immunities Act.”  The Solicitor General also asks us to vacate the judgment 
of the Court of Appeals and remand the case for consideration of whether the Ministry is 
simply a “foreign state” (what the Ministry calls “a foreign state stricto sensu ”) or 
whether the Ministry is an  “agency or instrumentality” of a foreign state (as the Ninth 
Circuit held)).  We grant the writ limited to Question 1. 
Id. (alteration in original) (citations omitted). 
 154. Id. at 450-53. 
 155. Id. at 452.  The Supreme Court determined that § 1610(a), which “applies to ‘property in 
the United States of a foreign state’ does not contain the ‘engaged in commercial activity’ 
exception. . . .”  Id. (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1610(a)) (alteration in original) (citation omitted).  The 
Supreme Court distinguished between § 1610(a), pertaining to “foreign states,” which contains the 
language “property . . . of a foreign state used for a commercial activity” (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 
1610(a)) (emphasis added), and § 1610(b), pertaining to “agencies or instrumentalities,” which 
contains the language “property . . . of an agency of instrumentality of a foreign state engaged in 
commercial  activities.”  Id. (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1610(b)) (emphasis added). 
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commercial activity’ exception that the Ninth Circuit described;”156 
however, it does contain the language “used for a commercial 
activity.”157  As the Comment demonstrates in Part V, the Supreme 
Court ignored a few essential points of analysis.158  While the Court did 
not decide whether the MOD was an agency or instrumentality of the 
state or part of the state itself, it cited precedent which held that foreign 
defense ministries are generally considered to be a part of the state.159  In 
a terse per curiam opinion, the Supreme Court remanded to the Ninth 
Circuit so that court could decide whether the property of a foreign state, 
strictly speaking located in the United States, is immune from 
attachment according to the FSIA.160 
E. On Remand to the Ninth Circuit 
On May 30, 2007, the Ninth Circuit decided that the judgment was 
immune from attachment under the commercial activities provision of 
the FSIA.161  The United States intervened in the case and argued that 
Elahi waived his right to the attachment because he accepted partial 
compensation pursuant to TRIA.162  According to the briefs, Elahi 
 156. Id. The only difference in language between the two exceptions is that the Section 
1610(a)(7) exception applies when the property of a foreign state is used for a commercial activity, 
while the Section 1610(b)(2) exception applies when the property of an agency or instrumentality of 
a foreign state is engaged in a commercial activity.  Id.  The Supreme Court did no analysis of why 
Congress chose these different terms.  Id. at 1193-95.  By framing the issue as it did, and rejecting 
the Amicus Brief’s second question, the Supreme Court functionally buried a crucial determination 
which could have led to redress. 
 157. See supra notes 38-42 (presenting the text of the law). 
 158. See infra Part IV (analysis regarding the 1610(a)(7) argument and others). 
 159. Iran, 546 U.S. at 452 (citing Transaero, Inc. v. La Fuerza Aerea Boliviana, 30 F.3d 148, 
153 (C.A. D.C. 1994).  The court in Transaero held that, “armed forces are as a rule so closely 
bound up with the structure of the state that they must in all cases be considered as ‘the foreign 
state’ itself, rather than a separate ‘agency or instrumentality’ of the state.”  Id. 
 160. Id. 
 161. Iran v. Elahi, 2007 WL 2034047 at *10 (9th Cir. July 17, 2007)).  The Ninth Circuit, upon 
remand, explained that the property at issue in Iran v. Elahi was a “blocked asset” because Iran’s 
interest in the asset arose before President Carter’s 1979 Executive Order to freeze Iranian assets 
after the Iranian hostage crisis.  Id. at *6. 
 162. E-mail from Jonathan R. Mook, Esq., Counsel of Record, DiMuro Ginsberg, P.C., to 
author (Dec. 28, 2006, 16:34:32 EST) (on file with author).  The Brief of Dariush Elahi in Response 
to Amicus Brief of the United States explained that: 
  In November 2002, Congress enacted the Terrorism Risk Insurance Act of 2002 
(“TRIA”), P.L. No. 107-297, 116 Stat. 2322 (2002).  That statute amended the Victims 
Protection Act to expand the class of judgment creditors eligible to receive payment 
from the U.S. Treasury Department for judgments against state sponsors of terrorism. 
  As pointed out in Elahi’s answering brief before this Court, Subsection 201(c) of the 
TRIA allowed him to make an application to the Department of Treasury to receive 
payment for compensatory damages from certain designated funds relating to rental 
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defended against this attack163 and argued that MOD acted as an agency 
or instrumentality of Iran primarily because it sued in its own name.164  
Rejecting this argument, the Ninth Circuit examined the foreign state 
attachment provision, 1610(a)(7).165  The Ninth Circuit ruled against the 
attachment under 1610(a)(7) by hanging its hat on the “used 
for”/”engaged in” distinction.166  The court ruled that the judgment 
would not be used for commercial activity because Iran intended to fold 
it into the general budget.167  As explored in Part V, this argument 
warrants much more judicial attention. 
V. SHORT SHRIFT FOR 1610(A)(7) 
A. Unexplored Territory in Elahi: 1610(a)(7) Attachment of Foreign 
State Property 
The 1610(a)(7) attachment immunity exception is appropriate if the 
judgment is related to a claim for which the foreign state is not immune 
under 1605(a)(7) (the terrorist state exception);168 the property at issue is 
property of a foreign state, as defined in 1603(a);169 and the property at 
proceeds from Iranian diplomatic properties and monies attributable to Iran’s Foreign 
Military Sales Account with the U.S. Treasury Department.  See Answering Brief of 
Appellee at 43 n. 25. 
Brief of Dariush Elahi in Response to Amicus Brief of the United States at 1, Iran v. Elahi, 495 F.3d 
1024 (2007) (No. 03-55015), 2006 WL 2951912. 
 163. Elahi argued that he did not relinquish his right to attach the Cubic judgment because of 
this partial payment.  Brief of Dariush Elahi in Response to Amicus Brief of the United States at 2-
3, Iran v. Elahi, 495 F.3d 1024 (2007) (No. 03-55015), 2006 WL 2951912.  He also argued that this 
issue is beyond the scope of the remand and that the United States did not properly raise it.  Id. at 4-
6.  Elahi cited cases which state that an appellate court may not consider issues that were not raised 
by the parties to the appeal.  Id.  Elahi then argued that it would be “fundamentally unfair” and 
against public policy to hold that Elahi relinquished his claim to the judgment.  Id. at 10-12. 
 164. Elahi's Response to MOD's Supplemental Rejoinder at 1-3, Iran v. Elahi, 495 F.3d 1024 
(2007) (No. 03-55015), 2006 WL 3014410 (“The House Report on the FSIA specifically states that 
‘entities which meet the definition of an “agency or instrumentality of a foreign state” could assume 
a variety of forms, including . . . a governmental . . . ministry which acts and is suable in its own 
name.’ Gates v. Victor Fine Foods, 54 F.3d 1457, 1460 (9th Cir. 1995), quoting H.R. Rep. No. 94-
1487, 94th Cong. 2nd Sess. 15-16 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6604, 6614.”). 
 165. Iran v. Elahi, 2007 WL 2034047 at *9-10 (9th Cir. July 17, 2007). 
 166. Id. 
 167. Id. 
 168. 28 U.S.C. § 1610(a)(7) (“The judgment relates to a claim for which the foreign state is not 
immune under section 1605(a)(7), regardless of whether the property is or was involved with the act 
upon which the claim is based.”). 
 169. 28 U.S.C. § 1603(a) says, “A ‘foreign state,’ except as used in section 1608 of this title, 
includes a political subdivision of a foreign state or an agency or instrumentality of a foreign state as 
defined in subsection (b).”  28 U.S.C. § 1603(a).  Subsection (b) states that “an ‘agency or 
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issue is used for a commercial activity.170  The 1610(a)(7) attachment 
provision was added to the FISA in order to deter terrorism and to 
provide redress to victims of terrorism.171  While there is a traditional 
hesitance toward executing upon the property of a foreign state, the 
terrorist state exception cannot do its job of providing redress to victims 
and deterring terrorism without it.172  If traditional policies for restricting 
execution against foreign state’s property are applied to restrict the 
attachment provisions of terrorist state exception, the policies effectively 
render the terrorist state exception impotent.173 
In Iran v. Elahi, Section 1610(a)(7) made a few appearances in the 
lower court opinions and briefs174 before the Supreme Court effectively 
instrumentality of a foreign state’ means any entity which is a separate legal person, corporate or 
otherwise, and which is an organ of a foreign state or political subdivision thereof, or a majority of 
whose shares or other ownership interest is owned by a foreign state or political subdivision thereof, 
and which is neither a citizen of a State of the United States as defined in section 1332(c) and (e) of 
this title, nor created under the laws of any third country.”  28 U.S.C. § 1603(b). 
 170. See supra notes 38-42 and accompanying text (containing statutory language).  28 U.S.C. 
§ 1603(d) defines commercial activity as “a regular course of commercial conduct or a particular 
commercial transaction or act.  The commercial character of an activity shall be determined by 
reference to the nature of the course of conduct or particular transaction or act, rather than by 
reference to its purpose.”  28 U.S.C. § 1603(d). 
 171. See supra note 30 and accompanying text (discussing the restrictive theory of sovereign 
immunity).  See infra Part III.B and accompanying text (regarding the worldwide hesitation to 
execute upon the property of another state).  Compare De Letelier, 748 F.2d at 799 (stating that 
Congress “was more cautious when lifting immunity from execution against property owned by the 
State itself.”), and Appellant’s Reply Brief at 27, Iran v. Cubic Defense Systems, 385 F.3d 1206 
(2004) (No. 03-55015), 2003 WL 22724233 (“One of the chief motifs of the FSIA is to limit as 
much as possible disrupting the ‘public acts’ or ‘Jure imperii’ of sovereigns, while restricting their 
purely commercial activity.” (citing H.R. Rep. 94-1487 at 7)), and Cubic, 385 F.3d 1206, 1219 
(2004) (citing De Letelier for the proposition that “Congress did not intend ‘to reverse completely 
the historical and international antipathy to executing against a foreign state's property even in cases 
where a judgment could be had on the merits.’” De Letelier, 748 F.2d at 798-99), with H.R. Rep. 
103-702 at 4 (discussing the need to provide terrorism victims with redress), and 142 Cong. Rec. 
H3605-04, *H3615 (1996) (explaining the need to deter terrorist states from harming U.S. citizens).  
It is the foreign states that Congress intended to punish, not their agencies or instrumentalities.  Id. 
 172. See supra note 9 and accompanying text (regarding the widespread practice of terrorist 
states failing to enter an appearance after they have been sued under the FSIA). 
 173. Jennifer Elise Plaster, Cold Comfort and a Paper Tiger: The (Un)Availability of 
Compensation for Victims of International Terrorism, 82 WASH. U. L.Q. 533, 533-34 (2004) 
[hereinafter Plaster, Cold Comfort]. 
 174. In its Ninth Circuit Appellant’s Brief, MOD presented the main arguments under separate 
headings, consisting of the following: that Iran did not waive sovereign immunity, Brief of 
Appellant at 10-17, Iran v. Elahi, 385 F.3d 1206 (2003) (No. 03-55015), 2003 WL 22724220, that 
the Cubic judgment is not subject to attachment under § 1611 (property of a military character or 
property of a central bank), Id. at 17-32, and that Iranian law prohibits the attachment.  Id. at 32-33. 
Elahi responded to each of MOD’s arguments. Answering Brief of Appellee at 9-36, Iran v. Elahi, 
385 F.3d 1206, (2003) (No. 03-55015), 2003 WL 22724229. He added that the judgment is subject 
to attachment under § 1610(f)(1)(A) or § 1610(a)(7) and added that vacating the attachment would 
frustrate United States foreign policy against terrorism.  Id. at 41-51. See also supra note 69 and 
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accompanying text (regarding TRIA).  When the case was finally remanded to the Ninth Circuit, the 
United States challenged the attachment on the grounds that Elahi accepted TRIA funds.  See supra 
notes 162, 163 and accompanying text.  While Elahi argued MOD is a foreign state in order to 
satisfy § 1610(a)(7), he also briefly noted § 1610(b)(2) would still allow the attachment if the court 
considered MOD to be an agency or instrumentality.  Id. at 47 (“If MOD is considered ‘an agency 
or instrumentality of a foreign state,’ rather than the foreign state itself, Mr. Elahi's attachment still 
is valid under 28 U.S.C. § 1610(b)(2), which allows the attachment of any property of ‘an agency or 
instrumentality of a foreign state engaged in commercial activity in the United States’ where, as 
here, the judgment relates to a claim under Section 1605(a)(7).”). 
  In his Ninth Circuit Answering Brief of Appellee, Elahi argued that the § 1610(a)(7) 
attachment immunity exception provided a “separate, independent statutory basis for affirming the 
district court's determination upholding the validity of Mr. Elahi's lien.”  Answering Brief of 
Appellee at 50, Iran v. Elahi, 385 F.3d 1206 (2004) (No. 03-55015), 2003 WL 22724229.  Elahi’s 
attorneys thoroughly analyzed the § 1610(a)(7) path to attachment immunity, devoting an entire 
section to the argument.  Id. at 45-50.  In the brief, Elahi argued first that Iran had waived its right to 
invoke sovereign immunity under § 1605(a)(1) and § 1605(a)(6) and disputed Iran’s argument 
regarding third party claims.  Id. at 10-20.  Next, Elahi argued that the judgment is not immune as 
“military property” under § 1611(b)(2) or “property of a central bank” under § 1611(b)(1).  Id. at 
24-32.  Then, Elahi argued that Iranian asset control regulations do not prevent the attachment of the 
judgment.  Id. at 36-41.  In case the waiver argument did not establish the exception to immunity, 
Elahi then argued that the judgment could be attached under § 1610(f)(1)(A) (TRIA) and § 
1610(a)(7).  Id. at 42-50.  Finally, Elahi argued that the removal of the lien would frustrate United 
States policy in combating terrorism.  Id. at 50-52.  The brief mentions that § 1610(b)(2) authorizes 
the attachment as well but, Elahi never committed to a position on whether or not MOD is an 
agency or instrumentality (implicating § 1610(b)(2)) or a foreign state (implicating § 1610(a)(7)), 
leaving the debate to the court. 
  Instead of saying that MOD is a “foreign state” or an “agency or instrumentality,” Elahi 
principally presents the § 1610(a)(7) argument (implying that he believes MOD is a foreign state), 
but slips in “but if MOD is considered an agency or instrumentality. . . ,” implying that he is not 
ready to answer the question himself.  Elahi may have done this because the § 1610(a)(7) exception 
applies if the property is that of a foreign state as defined in § 1603(a), which includes agencies and 
instrumentalities.  Therefore, any real debate between “foreign state” and “agencies or 
instrumentalities” is unnecessary under § 1610(a)(7).  However, the debate is still important in 
determining whether § 1610(a)(7) or § 1610(b)(2) applies. 
  MOD responded directly to the § 1610(a)(7) argument and briefly referenced the 
1610(b)(2) argument.  Appellant’s Reply Brief at 27-28, Iran v. Elahi, 385 F.3d 1206, (2003) (No. 
03-55015), 2003 WL 22724233.  MOD first introduces the difference in word choice between § 
1610(a)(7) and § 1610(b)(2).  Id. at 25-26.  It notes that § 1610(a)(7), which allows attachment of a 
foreign state’s property, only allows attachment of property used for a commercial activity, while § 
1610(b)(2), which allows attachment of an agency or instrumentality’s property, allows the 
attachment to proceed as long as the agency or instrumentality has engaged in commercial activity 
in the United States.  Id.  In support of its interpretation, MOD references de Letelier, which says 
that Congress intended to be more cautious in lifting attachment immunity over property belonging 
to the foreign state itself.  Id. at 3 (citing De Letelier v. Republic of Chile, 748 F.2d 790, 798-99 (2d 
Cir. 1984)).  MOD goes on to say that Congress intended the FSIA to limit the disruption of 
sovereign acts.  Id. at 26-27 (citing H.R. Rep. No. 94-1487).  MOD’s Reply Brief attempted to 
refute the § 1610(a)(7) argument for attachment.  Appellant’s Reply Brief at 25-28, Iran v. Elahi, 
385 F.3d 1206, (2003) (No. 03-55015).  MOD felt the argument was significant enough to devote 
three pages of its brief to it.  Id.  The Ninth Circuit authorized the attachment based on § 1610(b)(2), 
which governs attachment of the property of agencies or instrumentalities of a foreign state.  Iran, 
385 F.3d at 1219-22. 
  At the Supreme Court level, the United States, as amicus curiae, found it significant that 
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shut it down.175  Without explanation, the Court stated that the “engaged 
in commercial activity” exception did not apply to property of a foreign 
state - it only applied to property of an agency or instrumentality of a 
foreign state.176  The Court failed to provide any analysis of the 
significance of the “engaged in” and “used for” language and why the 
former applies only to property of an agency or instrumentality while the 
latter applies only to foreign states.177  If it had looked closer, the Court 
might have discovered a flaw in the engaged in/used for statutory 
language.  Instead, the Supreme Court simply cited Transaero for the 
proposition that a defense ministry is a part of a foreign state, but said it 
would not make a determination on MOD’s status.178 
As noted in Part III, the Ninth Circuit, upon remand hung its hat on 
the fact that Iran planned on incorporating the proceeds of the settlement 
into its general budget: 
To satisfy § 1610(a), MOD must have used the Cubic judgment for a 
commercial activity in the United States, and this it has not done.  We 
have recently stated that “property is ‘used for a commercial activity in 
the United States’ when it is put into action, put into service, availed or  
employed for a commercial activity, not in connection with a 
MOD did not have a chance to argue sufficiently on the 28 U.S.C. § 1610(a)(7) or (b)(2) 
determination.  Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae at 12, Iran v. Elahi, 546 U.S. 450 
(2006) (No. 04-1095), 2005 WL 3477863 (“Petitioner did not address the applicability of 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1610(a)(7) or 28 U.S.C. § 1610(b)(2), perhaps because the district court had not done so.”). 
  The Supreme Court concluded that the Ninth Circuit found for Elahi on a ground that the 
parties had not argued.  Iran v. Elahi, 546 U.S. 450, 452 (2006).  Also, at the Supreme Court level, 
the Brief for the United States as Amicus Curia mentioned that the Ninth Circuit missed an 
important antecedent determination as to whether § 1610(a)(7) or § 1610(b)(2) could authorize the 
attachment.  Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae at 4, Iran v. Elahi, 546 U.S. 450 (2006) 
(No. 04-1095), 2005 WL 3477863 (“The court therefore did not consider whether the attachment 
fell within the exception to that immunity in either 28 U.S.C. § 1610(a)(7) or 1610(b)(2).”). 
 175. Iran, 546 U.S. at 452 (regarding the Supreme Court’s usage of Transaero). 
 176. Id.  The court stated: 
The Act, as it applies to the “property in the United States of a foreign state,” . . . does 
not contain the “engaged in commercial activity” exception that the Ninth Circuit 
described.  That exception applies only where the property at issue is property of an 
“agency or instrumentality” of a foreign state. Compare § 1610(b) (“property . . . of an 
agency or instrumentality of a foreign state engaged in commercial activity”) with § 
1610(a) (“property . . . of a foreign state used for a commercial activity”) (emphasis 
added).  The difference is critical. 
Id. (alteration in original). 
 177. Id. at 451-52.  See also supra notes 152 (regarding the amicus brief analysis on “inclusive 
language”), 153 (presenting the Supreme Court’s terse analysis), 154 (on the amicus brief 
interpretation), 156 (showing the “used for”/ “engaged in” attachment immunity language 
difference for foreign states and their agencies/instrumentalities), and 164 (presenting the legislative 
history “variety of forms” language). 
 178. Iran, 546 U.S. at 452. 
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commercial activity or in relation to a commercial activity.”  Af-Cap 
Inc., 475 F.3d at 1091 (emphasis in original).  Cautioning that “FSIA 
does not contemplate a strained analysis of the words ‘used for’ and 
‘commercial activity,’ “we instructed courts to “consider[ ] the use of 
the property in question in a straightforward manner.”  Id.  The 
Ministry has not used the Cubic judgment as security on a loan, as 
payment for goods, or in any other commercial activity.  Instead, Iran 
intends to send the proceeds back to Iran for assimilation into MOD’s 
general budget.  Because repatriation into a ministry’s budget does not 
constitute commercial activity, we hold that the Cubic judgment is not 
subject to attachment under § 1610(a).179 
A close analysis of the Ninth Circuit’s language is warranted.  Even 
if it can be convincingly argued that the Cubic judgment is not “used for 
a commercial activity” according to the strictures of the language, the 
Court should have widened its scope to consider the overall logic of that 
language.  Impossibly, the statute requires the Court to project the future, 
determining what the foreign state intends to do with the property at 
issue.  Also, it is highly unlikely that any state whose property is up for 
attachment would inform the tribunal of its intent to put the property to 
the immediate purpose which would lead to its attachment. 
Another logical flaw in the big picture is the fact that it is nearly 
impossible for any of the terrorist states to conduct commercial activity 
in the United States, even if they wanted to. 
To be subject to this particular exception, the state must have 
earned the dubious honor of inscription on the State Department’s list of 
terrorist states.  Logic indicates that it is unlikely that the U.S. would be 
carrying on any substantial trade with any of these nations and, indeed, 
the U.S. is not.180  Since the 1977 implementation of the International 
 179. Iran v. Elahi, 2007 WL 2034047 at *10 (9th Cir. July 17, 2007). 
 180. See supra note 47 for the State Department list of terrorist states.  The United States trade 
embargo against Cuba commenced in 1962.  Eric Green, United States Department of State, U.S. 
Commerce Secretary Defends Trade Embargo on Cuba (2007), 
http://usinfo.state.gov/xarchives/display.html?p=washfile-
english&y=2007&m=February&x=200702211655561xeneerg0.2393457.  While the United States 
has eased the near total 1950 trade embargo on North Korea, the U.S. State Department describes 
trade interactions with North Korea as “minimal” and emphasizes that North Korea “does not enjoy 
‘Normal Trade Relations’ with the United States.”  U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, BACKGROUND NOTE: 
NORTH KOREA (2007), http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/2792.htm.  In 1997, President Clinton 
signed an Executive Order establishing a trade embargo with Sudan.  U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, 
AN OVERVIEW OF THE SUDANESE SANCTIONS REGULATIONS (2006), 
http://www.treas.gov/offices/enforcement/ofac/programs/sudan/sudan.pdf.  The order also froze 
Sudanese assets within the United States.  Id.  The trade embargo against Libya was substantially 
lifted in 2004, subject to certain limitations, in response to Libya’s sacrifice of its weapons of mass 
destruction.  Press Release, White House Press Secretary, U.S. Eases Economic Embargo Against 
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Emergency Economic Powers Act, the United States has maintained a 
trade embargo with Iran and has variously ceased trade with the other 
terrorist states, the recent exception being Libya.181  If the only way that 
the property of a terrorist state may be attached is if it is used for 
commercial activity in the United States, and those foreign states subject 
to the necessary antecedent terrorist state exception to immunity cannot 
conduct commercial activity in the United States, any judgment obtained 
against any of these states is unavoidably impotent from inception. 
It would have been helpful for the Supreme Court to have explained 
the effect of 1603(a), which defines “foreign state” for the purposes of 
the FSIA.182  As the Ninth Circuit wrote in its first opinion, the 1603(a) 
definition includes “a political subdivision of a foreign state or an 
agency or instrumentality.”183  This definition would appear to have 
great effects on 1610(a)(7), but it was never explored. 
Telescoping out even further, it can be argued that the general 
terrorist state exception to immunity treats plaintiffs inconsistently 
because it provides no redress for victims of terrorism caused by states 
which are not on the State Department’s list and victims of terrorism 
caused by states on the list, but who were injured before the state was 
placed on the list.184  Also, providing full redress to victims is unlikely 
because of a lack of attachable assets.185  Even if some plaintiffs 
recovered through the available assets, the assets would soon run out, 
creating an unfair situation for future plaintiffs.186  All of these flaws 
with the terrorist state exception of the FSIA add up to propagate 
unenforceable judgments.187  No court ever mentioned any of the larger 
ramifications of the statute discussed in Part III of this Comment.188  
These include the international law, foreign policy, and constitutional 
Libya (April 23, 2004), http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2004/04/20040423-9.html.  Also 
in 2004, the United States imposed trade sanctions on Syria in response to Syria’s failure to stop 
militants from streaming into Iraq.  US slaps trade sanctions on Syria, BBC NEWS, May 11, 2004, 
available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/3705783.stm. 
 181. See 50 U.S.C. §§ 1701-1707 (2007); PL 95-223, 1977 HR 7738.  See also Press Release, 
White House Press Secretary, U.S. Eases Economic Embargo Against Libya (April 23, 2004), 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2004/04/20040423-9.html. 
 182. See supra notes 141-142. 
 183. Cubic, 385 F.3d at 1220. 
 184. Taylor, Another Front, supra note 50, at 550-53 (citing Saudi Arabia v. Nelson, 507 U.S. 
349, 363 (1993) (denying claim because Saudi Arabia is not on the list); Roeder v. Islamic Republic 
of Iran, 195 F. Supp. 2d 140, 159-60 (D.D.C. 2002) (denying claim because the terrorist act 
occurred before Iran was on the list)). 
 185. Taylor, Another Front, supra note 50, at 552. 
 186. Id. 
 187. See supra Part III.A. 
 188. See supra Part III.B. 
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questions presented by the terrorist state attachment provision.189  The 
1610(a)(7) argument was given short shrift in the Supreme Court, which 
swept all of these issues under the rug. Because the Supreme Court gave 
no guidance on the 1610(a)(7) path of reasoning, Elahi safely, yet 
nonsensically, argued MOD as an “agency or instrumentality” under 
1610(b)(2) in his remand brief.190  In the face of the longstanding rule 
against attaching the property of a foreign sovereign, and without the 
support of the Supreme Court (as they had cited Transaero), it makes 
sense that Elahi would hesitate to invoke this controversial statutory 
provision (1610(a)(7)) on remand.191  It is unfortunate that Elahi was 
forced to argue that MOD is an agency or instrumentality of Iran 
because it is unlikely that a defense ministry would be characterized as 
anything other than the foreign state itself.192 
The Supreme Court never assessed the real difference between 
1610(a)(7) and 1610(b)(2), and never reached the heart of the matter.193  
If it is never appropriate to attach the property of a foreign state, then the 
terrorist state exception can never be used to do anything other than 
obtain worthless judgments194 – or judgments that will eventually be 
paid out of frozen funds or diplomatic assets,195 which provide some 
redress,196 but skimp on deterrence.197 
 189. See supra Part III.B. 
 190. See supra note 164 and accompanying text (regarding Elahi’s argument that MOD is an 
agency or instrumentality of Iran). 
 191. Iran v. Elahi, 546 U.S. 450, 450-53 (2006). 
 192. See supra note 159 and accompanying text (discussing Transaero). 
 193. Iran, 546 U.S. at 450-53. 
 194. See supra notes 9, 13, 60 (regarding the chronic proliferation of default judgments in 
terrorist state exception cases) and accompanying text. 
 195. See supra notes 13, 62-64, and accompanying text (regarding the use of frozen assets and 
diplomatic property to pay judgments as hurtful to foreign policy).  See also supra notes 69-72 
(regarding TRIA). 
 196. Kim explains the problems with TRIA: 
  The act also provides for the payment of some judgments against Iran.  However, 
this compensation is disbursed arbitrarily; payment is contingent upon the speed with 
which the plaintiffs were able to secure judgments.  First, the act prioritizes payment to a 
few plaintiffs who secured judgments on specific dates.  Other successful plaintiffs are 
next in line, followed by those with decisions currently pending.  Future plaintiffs will 
theoretically be paid with whatever remains of Iran's frozen assets.  The result is that 
some plaintiffs will receive legislative priority and collect more than others, while the 
fate of future victims of terrorism who may bring suit in the coming years is uncertain at 
best.  Moreover, the system of payment under TRIA ensures that no plaintiff will receive 
the full amount of the judgment awarded by the courts since judgments will be paid on a 
by-share basis and payments are limited to compensatory damages only.  Also, the 2002 
legislation fails to mention punitive damages. 
  Although well-intentioned, this latest modification to plaintiffs’ remedies is far from 
sufficient in addressing the problems with the terrorist exceptions to the FSIA.  While 
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B. The Court’s Duty 
Just as there is no rule requiring the party to present the best 
argument for the development of the law, the party’s attorney is merely 
obligated to present the most winning arguments for the sake of the 
client.198  These arguments must be simply supported by citation to 
authority199 and analysis.200 
Likewise, there is no clear current standard outlining a court’s duty 
the new legislation gives some plaintiffs the promise of payment, efforts to secure 
payment will continue to involve uphill battles as plaintiffs try to force the U.S. 
government to release frozen assets. 
Jeewon Kim, Making State Sponsors of Terrorism Pay: A Separation of Powers Discourse Under 
the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, 22 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 513, 522 (2004) [hereinafter Kim, 
Making State Sponsors Pay].  Taylor, Another Front, supra note 50, at 550-53 (citing Saudi Arabia 
v. Nelson, 507 U.S. 349 (1993) (claim denied because Saudi Arabia is not on the official list of 
terrorist states); Roeder v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 195 F. Supp. 2d 140, 159-60 (D.D.C. 2002) 
(claim denied because terrorist act accomplished before Iran was on the list)). 
 197. Kim, Making State Sponsors Pay, at 521 (discussing how there is no deterrent effect on 
Iran because Iran does not actually pay when frozen assets are used to pay plaintiffs).  Plaster, Cold 
Comfort, supra note 173, at 550-51(explaining the deterrence failure). 
 198. The ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct require a lawyer to act with reasonable 
diligence in representing a client, from which it can be implied that the lawyer must present the best 
arguments for the client, but not that the lawyer must present the best objective legal argument in 
furtherance of the development of the law.  MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.3 (2004).  
There is a somewhat heightened standard for criminal cases where incarceration may result, which 
states, “A lawyer for the defendant in a criminal proceeding, or the respondent in a proceeding that 
could result in incarceration, may nevertheless so defend the proceeding as to require that every 
element of the case be established.”  MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.1 (2004).  However, 
there is also rule on expediting litigation, which states that, “A lawyer shall make reasonable efforts 
to expedite litigation consistent with the interests of the client.”  MODEL RULES OF PROF’L 
CONDUCT R. 3.2 (2004). 
 199. See, e.g., McLemore v. Fleming, 604 So.2d 353, 353 (Ala. 1992) (requiring arguments to 
be supported by citation to authority); Wilson v. Taylor, 577 N.W.2d 100, 105 (Mich. 1998) (stating 
that a statement without authority is insufficient to raise an issue before the court); Charolais 
Breeding Ranches, Ltd. v. FPC Securities Corp., 279 N.W.2d 493, 499 (Wis. 1979) (requiring that 
arguments be supported by citation to authority). 
 200. See, e.g., People v. DeSantis, 831 P.2d 1210, 1224 (Cal. 1992) (“Defendant contends 
there is ‘also another reason for suppressing the physical lineup,’ i.e., the fact that defense counsel 
had been barred from questioning the witness immediately following her identification at the 
physical lineup.  As noted, the trial court excluded evidence of the physical lineup because of this 
fact.  To the extent defendant argues that this exclusion alone rendered the in-court identification 
inadmissible, regardless of any suggestiveness in the lineups, he does not support the claim with 
adequate argument.  We therefore reject the point as not properly raised.”); Allmaras v. Yellowstone 
Basin Properties, 812 P.2d 770, 773 (Mont. 1991) (“Plaintiffs cite no legal authority, nor do 
plaintiffs explain how the Wrongful Discharge Act violates substantive due process beyond a 
reiteration that it is discriminatory, which has already been addressed under Issue II. Rule 23(a)(4), 
M.R. App. P. requires the appellant to file a brief containing ‘the contentions of the appellant with 
respect to the issues presented, and the reasons therefore, with citations to the authorities . . . relied 
on.’  Plaintiffs’ due process argument fails to comply with this requirement and this Court will not 
address this issue.”). 
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to adjudicate on the merits of all arguments presented to the court or to 
discover and apply the “best” or “most needed” legal arguments.201  The 
ABA Model Code of Judicial Conduct does not directly address the 
judge’s duty to evaluate presented arguments or to dig for better 
arguments if those presented by the parties are not the most optimal for 
developing the law.202  The only duty imposed by the ABA Model Code 
which remotely establishes a duty to analyze arguments is Canon 2.203  
The few ABA Model Code elements which support the judge in his 
endeavors to uncover better arguments include Rule 2.9, which permits a 
judge to consult an expert on the law204 and the Comments section to 
Canon 3 in the 2004 Code, which says that judges may ask parties to 
submit additional factual findings and conclusions of law.205 
There are portions of the Model Code establishing case 
management duties which address the minimum treatment that judges 
must give their cases, but the practical realities of the overburdened 
United States court system work against finding a judicial duty to 
analyze all arguments, remark upon all arguments, or press forward to 
 201. See infra notes 210-214 and accompanying text (regarding the lack of a standard 
establishing duty to adjudicate). 
 202. See generally MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT (2007) available at 
http://www.abanet.org/judicialethics/ABA_MCJC_approved.pdf. 
 203. MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 2 (2007) (“A judge shall perform the duties 
of judicial office impartially, competently, and diligently.”).  MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT 
R. 2.7 (2007) (“A judge shall hear and decide matters assigned to the judge, except when 
disqualification is required by Rule 2.7 or other law.”); MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 
1 (2007) (“A judge shall uphold and promote the independence, integrity and impartiality of the 
judiciary and shall avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety.”).  A duty to analyze 
arguments that the parties present can be implied from the duty to hear and decide and the duty to 
uphold the integrity of the judiciary.  A judge hears factual evidence and legal argument and is duty 
bound to render a decision.  A judge would not be able to uphold the integrity of the judiciary 
without analyzing the arguments the parties present.  Indeed, the ABA Model Code commentary to 
Canon 1 says that, “‘Integrity’ means probity, fairness, honesty, uprightness, and soundness of 
character.”  MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Cannon 1 cmt. (2007), available at 
http://www.abanet.org/cpr/mcjc/canon_1.html. 
 204. “A judge may obtain the written advice of a disinterested expert on the law applicable to a 
proceeding before the judge, if the judge gives advance notice to the parties of the person to be 
consulted and the subject matter of the advice to be solicited, and affords the parties a reasonable 
opportunity to object and respond to the notice and to the advice received.”  CODE OF JUDICIAL 
CONDUCT R. 2.9(2) (2007). 
 205. “A judge may request a party to submit proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law, 
so long as the other parties are apprised of the request and are given an opportunity to respond to the 
proposed findings and conclusions.”  CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 3 cmt. (2004), available 
at http://www.abanet.org/cpr/mcjc/canon_3.html.  The Committee, which revised the Model Code 
of Judicial Conduct in 2007, removed this language because it felt that it was such a well-
established concept that the language was unnecessary.  A.B.A. JOINT COMMISSION TO EVALUATE 
THE MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT, REPORTER’S EXPLANATION OF CHANGES, ABA MODEL 
CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT, 2007, http://www.abanet.org/judicialethics/mcjc-2007.pdf. 
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find the best argument.206  Under the current law, there is little hope for 
any of the issues ventilated in this Comment to see the light of a 
courtroom. 
C. Emerging Scholarship 
An array of scholars, including Professors Oldfather, Cravens and 
Dworkin, have considered the issue and argue that the legal system can 
and should do better to get to the “right” argument.  There are arguably 
two different levels of analysis which were both neglected in Iran v. 
Elahi – the first being a deeper treatment of the 1610(a)(7) argument as a 
means for attachment,207 the second being a more complete analysis of 
the constellation of issues sparking off of the Elahi situation.208  
Professor Oldfather couches the issue in terms of “judicial 
inactivism.”209  In the face of the frustrating dearth of case or statutory 
law on the topic,210  Oldfather reasons that judges are subject to a duty to 
 206. The ABA Model Code reminds judges that “[p]ublic confidence in the judicial system 
depends upon timely justice.”  CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT R. 2.12 cmt. [2] (2007).  However, the 
practical realities of the overburdened modern court system are reflected in the lack of rigid 
standards on this issue.  Most judges labor under an immense caseload.  See Sarah B. Duncan, 
Pursuing Quality: Writing a Helpful Brief, 30 ST. MARY’S L.J. 1093, 1098-99 (1999) (explaining 
the high judicial workload from the perspective of an appellate judge). This reality forms the central 
counterargument to imposing any distinct requirement on judges to analyze each argument 
presented to them or to delve further than the parties in uncovering the truth.  Some scholars argue 
that the deluge of cases flooding the system leads to a breakdown in the fulfillment of adjudicative 
duty, particularly in the Ninth Circuit.  Stefanie A. Lindquist, Bureaucratization and Balkanization: 
The Origins and Effects of Decision-Making Norms in the Federal Appellate Courts, 41 U. RICH. L. 
REV. 659, 659-63 (2007). 
 207. See supra Part V.A. 
 208. These being the constitutional, foreign policy, and international law implications.  See 
supra Part III. 
 209. See Chad M. Oldfather, Defining Judicial Inactivism: Models of Adjudication and the 
Duty to Decide, 94 GEO. L. J. 121, 123 (2005) [hereinafter Oldfather, Inactivism] (“And if there is 
good reason to be concerned about judges acting in ways that go beyond their assigned role, then 
there is good reason to be concerned about judges acting in ways that fall short of their assigned 
role.”).  Unfortunately, he says that when judges fail to act, the failure is often difficult to detect, 
because “doing nothing generally leaves fewer traces than doing something.”  Id.  See also Sarah 
M.R. Cravens, Involved Appellate Judging, 88 MARQ. L. REV. 251, 267-74 (2004) [hereinafter 
Cravens, Involved] (explaining the passive and active models of judging). 
 210. A diligent sifting of the law turns up no statements of the actual judicial mandate to 
decide. Oldfather, Inactivism, supra note 209, at 127-28.  “And despite the occasional suggestions 
of a more broadly applicable duty, there simply does not exist a body of law that meaningfully 
supports such a doctrine, to say nothing of a developed jurisprudence addressing what the duty 
might require.”  Id. at 129.  While there is not a body of law on the courts’ duty to decide, courts 
have occasionally addressed the issue.  Id. at 128 (citing United States v. Garza, 165 F.3d 312, 314 
(5th Cir. 1999); Bernklau v. Principi, 291 F.3d 795, 801 (Fed. Cir. 2002)).  Oldfather also notes the 
broad spectrum of “simply picking a winner” to evaluating every single argument presented by the 
parties.  Id. at 126. 
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adjudicate which extends beyond merely deciding cases.211  Explaining 
the standard’s functioning, Oldfather states “In any event, it seems 
indisputable that, even if a court can be excused for electing not to do 
the parties’ work for them, there must come a point where the parties 
have satisfied their participatory obligations with respect to an argument, 
thereby triggering the adjudicative duty.”212  Oldfather proposes that a 
judge has a duty to explain her reasoning on arguments that the parties 
have presented “in a meaningful way.”213  But what of decisions sans 
analysis, or decisions accompanied by analysis, but analysis of a low 
quality?214  This incomplete or shoddy analysis would normally be 
corrected in a higher court, but, as in Iran v. Elahi, not when the opinion 
is issued by the Supreme Court or an appellate court on remand. 
On the appellate level, there is a persuasive argument that the 
Respondent’s Brief in Opposition presented the 1610(a)(7) argument to 
the court in a meaningful way, but the opinion barely regarded its 
existence.215  On the Supreme Court level, the United States, in its 
 211. Id. at 127.  Oldfather concludes that the existence of justiciability doctrines (which excuse 
courts from deciding certain issues) implies that there is a requirement to decide.  Id. 
 212. Id. at 130-31.  Oldfather particularly notes that it is not reasonable for the court to address 
every single argument presented in the brief.  For example, it is reasonable for the court to gloss 
over a small undeveloped argument presented at the end of the brief.  Id.  However, if the court 
neglects an argument at the forefront of the brief, there is an argument that the court has neglected 
to do its job.  Id.  In contrast, Judge Richard Posner lambastes unrealistic scholars (including 
Dworkin) who, from their ivory towers, admonish judges to consider all relevant arguments and 
sources of law.  He argues that the realities and pressures of the job lead most judges to apply a 
more pragmatic approach to decision making.  Richard A. Posner, The Role of the Judge in the 
Twenty-First Century, 86 B.U. L. REV. 1049, 1053-54 (2006).  However, there is a convincing 
argument that judges are the trustees of the common law, which belongs to all in society, and, as 
such, judges need to arrive at the best reasoning since it has the potential to impact all in society.  
Cravens, Involved, supra note 209, at 252-55.  If, due to the practical realities of the job, judges 
cannot carry out this task, perhaps society itself needs to do more to ensure the proper care and 
feeding of its common law. 
 213. Oldfather, Inactivism, supra note 209, at 130. 
 214. Various scholars have been writing on the vital importance of the publication of 
meaningful reasoning in judicial opinions.  See Sarah M.R. Cravens, Judges as Trustees: A Duty to 
Account and an Opportunity for Virtue, 62 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1637, 1639 (2005); David Luban, 
Settlements and the Erosion of the Public Realm, 83 GEO. L.J. 2619, 2626 (1995).  For a discussion 
of judicial candor, see generally Scott C. Idleman, A Prudential Theory of Judicial Candor, 73 TEX. 
L. REV. 1307 (1995). 
 215. See supra Part V.A.  Elahi’s attorneys presented the argument in Section F of the brief, 
titled “MOD's Judgment Is Subject to Attachment under Section 1610(a)(7).”  Answering Brief of 
Appellee at *ii, Iran v. Elahi, 385 F.3d 1206, (2003) (No. 03-55015), 2003 WL 22724229.  The 
attorneys developed the argument over the course of six pages, analyzing each of the elements.  Id. 
at 45-51.  The Ninth Circuit obliquely addressed the argument after determining that § 1610(b)(7) 
authorized the attachment: in a single sentence, the court absolved itself of the need to address any 
other arguments for attachment because it was satisfied with the § 1610(b)(2) basis. 
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Amicus Brief, spotlighted the 1610(a)(7) argument.216  However, all the 
attention that the Supreme Court could muster for the argument was 
delivered in three sentences217 within an opinion of less than two pages.  
As discussed earlier, the Court dismissively left the Ninth Circuit to 
decide whether MOD is a “state” or an “agency or instrumentality of a 
state.”  Upon remand, Elahi focused his attentions on arguments other 
than 1610(a)(7) - for good reasons.218 
Even though the current standard does not require an appellate 
court to address arguments not adequately presented in briefs,219 
Professor Dworkin, in his Law as Integrity thesis, argues that the 
judiciary should be held to a higher standard.220  Residing at the extreme 
end of the spectrum, Dworkin contends that judges are obligated to 
develop and refine the law to be the best that it can be.221  To develop 
his theory, Dworkin imagined an idealized character - “Judge Hercules” 
- possessing limitless time and full knowledge of all relevant legal 
sources.222  Dworkin argues that Judge Hercules would always be able to 
come to a “right answer” if he assessed all relevant sources of law and 
then employed the reasoning which best suited the common law as a 
whole.223 
If the Herculean tasks in Iran v.Elahi were presented to Judge 
Hercules, the opinions would have turned out quite differently.  Judge 
Hercules would have considered the landscape of the law “as a whole.”  
The judges who heard the case would have been doing a service to all if 
 216. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae at 13, 546 U.S. 450 (2006) (No. 04-1095), 
2005 WL 3477863 (“Given the way the parties presented the case on appeal, it is puzzling that the 
court of appeals failed to consider the applicability of Section 1610(a)(7), which respondent had 
expressly identified as an alternative ground for affirmance, and instead proceeded to hold that the 
property is subject to attachment under Section 1610(b)(2), on which respondent had not relied as 
an alternative ground for affirmance.  The court did so, moreover, without even adverting to the 
critical antecedent question of whether petitioner falls within the FSIA's definition of an ‘agency or 
instrumentality’ covered by Section 1610(b)(2).”). 
 217. Iran v. Elahi, 546 U.S. 450, 452 (2007) (“The Act, as it applies to the ‘property in the 
United States of a foreign state,’ . . . , does not contain the ‘engaged in commercial activity’ 
exception that the Ninth Circuit described. That exception applies only where the property at issue 
is property of an ‘agency or instrumentality’ of a foreign state. Compare § 1610(b) (‘property . . . of 
an agency or instrumentality of a foreign state engaged in commercial activity’) with § 1610(a) 
(‘property . . . of a foreign state used for a commercial activity’) (emphasis added). The difference is 
critical.” (emphasis in original)). 
 218. See supra note 164 and accompanying text. 
 219. See supra note 210 and accompanying text. 
 220. RONALD DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE 87-114, 225-75 (1986) [hereinafter DWORKIN, 
EMPIRE].  Dworkin believes that judges operate under a mandate to “perfect” the law.  Id. 
 221. Id. 
 222. Id. at 239-75. 
 223. Id. at 245. 
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it they had written opinions considering the case’s wider implications, 
such as those concerning the constitutional, statutory construction, 
foreign policy, and international law issues.  Dworkin advises against 
compartmentalization of the law.224  The glaring omissions in Iran v. 
Elahi may have been a product of such compartmentalization - the 
courts steered clear of turning it into a constitutional case or an 
international law/foreign policy case when they easily could have. 
These omissions may also have been a product of a system which 
generally relies on parties to raise the best arguments and advise the 
court on the law.  Cravens argues that the U.S. common law system, 
which relies so heavily on precedent, cannot afford to accord individual 
parties inordinate control over judicial decision-making, as individual 
parties are capable of missing relevant arguments.225  Thus enters the 
notion that the common law is “owned” by society, while judges act as 
“trustees” over it.226  It is not insignificant that the oft-cited rule that 
parties waive any issues not raised below applies only to the parties and 
not to judges.227  The courts in Iran v. Elahi were in no way prevented 
from taking up such issues.228 
Under Dworkin’s analysis, the Ninth Circuit and Supreme Court 
would be required to take into account the 1610(a)(7) provision on 
foreign state property attachment and the peripheral issues.  Iran v. Elahi 
arguably presents twelve analytical labors for Judge Hercules.  The first 
group deals with Part III’s Problem of Enforcement and includes: (1) the 
 224. Id. at 251 (“Law as integrity has a more complex attitude towards departments of law.  Its 
general spirit condemns them because the adjudicative principle of integrity asks them to make the 
law coherent as a whole, so far as they can, and this might be better done by ignoring academic 
boundaries and reforming some departments of law radically to make them more consistent in 
principle with others.”). 
 225. Cravens writes that: 
On one side is the idea that the role of the court is to act as an impartial arbiter -- to settle 
the specific disputes between the parties before the court, answering only the questions 
explicitly presented, and doing so by considering only the arguments the parties have 
explicitly presented.  On the other side is the idea that the role of the court is to 
determine and announce what the law is, and that in a common law system, 
determination of the law affects more than just the parties before a single court in a given 
case.  When so much value is placed on precedent, the ramifications of decisions are too 
important to allow parties any kind of absolute control over the decision-making process. 
Cravens, Involved, supra note 209, at 254-55.  To set up her arguments, Cravens queries, “[W]hat 
happens when the parties simply miss the point?”  Id. at 251. 
 226. See supra note 212 (regarding judges as trustees). 
 227. Cravens, Involved, supra note 209, at 267. 
 228. For a treatment of the arguments against sua sponte decision-making, see generally Barry 
A. Miller, Sua Sponte Appellate Rulings: When Courts Deprive Litigants of an Opportunity to be 
Heard, 39 SAN DIEGO. L. REV. 1253 (2002). 
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under-inclusiveness of the terrorist state exception;229 (2) the statutory 
language forcing the court to consider the terrorist state’s intended 
purpose for the property in assessing the “engaged in/used for” 
distinction;230 (3) the Section 1603 definition of “foreign state,” which 
happens to include “agencies and instrumentalities;”231 (4) the fact that 
the U.S. would not be likely to carry on trade with any terrorist state, 
making recovery nearly impossible from the statute’s inception;232 (5) 
the proliferation of unenforceable judgments under the terrorist state 
exception due to the growing problem of terrorism;233 (6) whether or not 
1610(a)(7) has been pre-empted by TRIA and other recovery provisions; 
(7) the fact that the Congressional purpose of deterrence cannot be 
achieved when judgments get paid out of TRIA frozen assets;234 (8) that 
even with partial recovery under TRIA, plaintiffs can never achieve full 
redress.235  The second group of labors for our Judge Hercules concerns 
Part III’s Problem with Enforcement and includes: (9) the potential 
violations of international law inherent in 1610(a)(7);236 (10) the foreign 
policy problems of reciprocity;237 (11) whether or not the whole issue 
presents a non-justiciable political question;238 (12) the issue of 
minimum contacts.239 
While it may be impossible for judges to realistically consider all 
relevant sources comprising the fabric of the common law,240 the garish 
analytical deficiencies in Iran v. Elahi present a compelling argument 
that courts need to be doing more than they are.  When presented with 
such a cumbersome and complex statute packing ponderous 
ramifications, it would behoove the court to look outside of the certain 
arguments presented by individual parties and into the larger context 
surrounding the issue. 
 229. See supra note 185. 
 230. See supra Part V.A. 
 231. Id.  
 232. Id. 
 233. See supra Part III.A. 
 234. See supra Part V.A. 
 235. See supra note 46 and note 197. 
 236. See supra Part III.B.1 
 237. Id. 
 238. See supra Part III.B.2. 
 239. Id. 
 240. Dworkin realizes the constraints imposed by reality, but believes that judges can, “imitate 
Hercules in a limited way.”  DWORKIN, EMPIRE, supra note 220, at 245. 
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VI. CONCLUSION 
If 1610(a)(7) and the avoided quagmire addressed in  Part III is 
viewed through the lens of The Twelve Labors of Judge Hercules, the 
courts’ neglect becomes striking.  If the courts in Iran v. Elahi had taken 
some minimum extra analytical steps suggested by Oldfather, Cravens, 
or Dworkin in order to analyze the worth of 1610(a)(7), there would be 
some much needed clarity regarding this radical doctrine, which is so far 
out of step with the rest of the world.241 
If there had been a clear analysis, future terrorist victims would be 
able to know whether the expense of a terrorist state exception lawsuit 
would ever result in cash.  Likewise, future terrorist victim judgment 
holders would know whether 1610(a)(7) is a reliable source of redress, 
or if it would never be applied so that they should limit their 
expectations to TRIA.242  Most importantly, if, after careful analysis, the 
court deemed 1610(a)(7) a viable means to take meaningful assets away 
from terrorist states, those state actors could even be deterred from 
sponsoring acts of terrorism.243 
Anneliese Gryta 
 241. See supra Part IV.B.3. 
 242. See supra Part II.B. 
 243. See supra Part III-IV (explaining how the 1610(a)(7) attachment provision is essential to 
carry out the underlying policies of the terrorist state exception, deterrence, and redress). 
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